

21-024 Removing lookout competency

[This page should be deleted at the publication stage of the project]

Version:	0.03		
Purpose:	Approval to proceed to consultation		
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Lead industry committee:	Traffic Operation and Management Standards Committee (TOM SC)	Date:	25 March 2025
Supporting industry committee:	Control, Command and Signalling Standards Committee (CCS SC)	Date:	10 April 2025
Supporting industry committee:	Plant Standards Committee (PLT SC)	Date:	By correspondence

Decision

Decision

TOM SC is asked to:

- **APPROVE** that the proposed revisions to the Rule Book handbooks below are consulted on.
In approving the Rule Book handbooks for consultation the SC has:
 - DECIDED that the proposed revisions deliver the intentions of the proposal for change.
 - DECIDED that the proposed revisions are in a suitable state for consultation.
- **IDENTIFY** any specific organisations or individuals to be included in the consultation.

CCS SC and PLT SC are asked to:

- **SUPPORT** that the proposed revisions to the Rule Book handbooks are consulted on.
In supporting the Rule Book handbooks for consultation the SC has:
 - SUPPORTED that the proposed revisions deliver the intentions of the proposal for change.
 - SUPPORTED that the proposed revisions are in a suitable state for consultation.
- **CONSIDER** whether they need any further involvement in the project beyond the pre-consultation stage. (NB they would still be involved in formal consultation)

21-024 Removing lookout competency

This business case for change has been developed to support standards committees in taking decisions related to changes to standards. It includes an assessment of the predicted impacts arising from the change.

Proposed revised documents

Number	Title	Issue
GERT8000-HB3	Duties of the lookout and site warden	4
GERT8000-HB7	General duties of a controller of site safety (COSS)	10
GERT8000-HB9	IWA or COSS setting up safe systems of work within possessions	9
GERT8000-HB9ERTMS	IWA or COSS setting up safe systems of work within possessions on ERTMS lines where lineside signals are not provided	3
GERT8000-HB12	Duties of the engineering supervisor (ES) in a possession	11
GERT8000-HB12 ERTMS	Duties of the engineering supervisor (ES) in a possession on ERTMS lines where lineside signals are not provided	3
RS521	Signals, Handsignals, Indicators and Signs	9

Proposed superseded documents

Number	Title	Issue
GERT8000-HB3	Duties of the lookout and site warden	3
GERT8000-HB7	General duties of a controller of site safety (COSS)	9
GERT8000-HB9	IWA or COSS setting up safe systems of work within possessions	8.1
GERT8000-HB9ERTMS	IWA or COSS setting up safe systems of work within possessions on ERTMS lines where lineside signals are not provided	2
GERT8000-HB12	Duties of the engineering supervisor (ES) in a possession	10
GERT8000-HB12 ERTMS	Duties of the engineering supervisor (ES) or safe work leader (SWL) in a possession on ERTMS lines where lineside signals are not provided	2
RS521	Signals, Handsignals, Indicators and Signs	8

Summary

Background and change

Since the fatalities at Margam in 2019 and the subsequent establishment of its Safety Task Force, Network Rail has had an intention of reducing, and ultimately eliminating, unassisted lookouts as an acceptable safe system of work. A project was established with the intention of updating the Rule Book as necessary as this initiative progressed.

This reduction had implications for a group walking on or near the line, where lookouts had traditionally been utilised to provide a safe system of work. Network Rail submitted a Request for Help (21-REQ-022) with the aim of providing greater clarity and removing ambiguity as to who, where and for what reason walking is permitted on or near the line for trackworkers, including the question of crossing open lines whilst doing so. This resulted in project 21-016 being established and project 21-024 was placed on hold in the interests of resourcing that project.

More recently, the Network Rail Technical Authority commissioned a 'retrospective HAZID' to identify the continued extent of the use of unassisted lookouts and the potential for removing their use completely. Together with subsequent discussions within Network Rail, this has led to a conclusion that the requirement to use lookouts can be confined to slow speed locations, subject to a process of risk assessment to justify their use within a framework of company instructions.

This has allowed conclusions to be drawn on the necessary Rule Book requirements for the future, with a view to implementation in December 2025.

Industry impact due to changes

Impact areas	Scale of impact	Estimated value		
A. Legal compliance and assurance	Medium	£175,000		
B. Health, safety and security	Medium	£3,831,250		
C. Reliability and operational performance	Medium	£55,120		
D. Design and maintenance	Low	Not proportionate to quantify		
E. People, process and systems	Low	Not proportionate to quantify		
F. Environment and sustainability	N/A	-		
G. Customer experience and industry reputation	Low	Not proportionate to quantify		
Total value of industry opportunity =		£4,061,370		
The standards change contribution to the total value of industry opportunity				
<input type="checkbox"/> None or low	<input type="checkbox"/> Minor but useful	<input type="checkbox"/> Moderate	<input type="checkbox"/> Important / essential	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Urgent / critical

Detail

1. What are the objectives associated with this change?

Objective 1 – To review the situations in which the use of unassisted lookouts is permitted and the extent to which this is a continuing requirement

- 1.1 The Rule Book and its application in practice has historically permitted the use of unassisted lookouts in five main situations.
- 1.2 To allow a group under the supervision of a controller of site safety (COSS) to carry out work that does not affect the safety of the line on a running line that remains open to traffic. This is currently permitted within the Rule Book. During darkness, poor visibility or when working in or near a tunnel the speed of approaching trains must not exceed 20 mph, and the use of intermediate and distant lookouts is not permitted. This was the focus of the Safety Task Force's initial drive, which according to Network Rail's data has resulted in no more than 1% of activities in 2024 being protected by lookout warning (this includes the use of lookout operated warning systems (LOWS)).
- 1.3 Previous instances have been eliminated by planning to undertake the work within the protection of possessions or line blockages, by transferring work to the night hours, and by adopting changed working practices which have reduced the need to undertake work on or near the line. Continued use of lookouts in this situation on Network Rail infrastructure requires director level approval. A further means of reducing the use of unassisted lookouts has been the adoption of the equipment warning systems which are regarded as being higher in the hierarchy of safe systems of work.
- 1.4 The conclusion of the HAZID work referred to was that, given an appropriate degree of support, those routes or regions that had not already managed to eliminate this activity would be able to do so by the end of 2025.
- 1.5 The scope of the HAZID was agreed as excluding any consideration of LOWS as a method of warning.
- 1.6 A group is required to walk on or near the line to access or return from a site of work without the adjacent line being blocked to traffic. The rule changes concerning walking on or near the line implemented from December 2024 introduced new requirements when a COSS is to walk with a group, with a safe system of work being mandated, but the use of lookouts only being allowed if this has been authorised.
- 1.7 A group is to work within a work site. This is permitted subject to a maximum speed of 25 mph being assumed during daylight, and during darkness, poor visibility or when in or near a tunnel when the COSS has agreed with the engineering supervisor (ES) that trains on the line concerned will not exceed 20 mph, and the maximum speed of trains on any open line will not exceed 20 mph.
- 1.8 The HAZID workshops were not able to establish a clear view on the extent to which lookouts are used within possessions, although it is obvious that this scenario can be eliminated if COSSs 'sign in' with the ES.

- 1.9 To work within a possession but outside a work site with the authority of the person in charge of the possession (PICOP). This is permitted, except during darkness, poor visibility or when in or near a tunnel, with warning arrangements set up for a maximum speed of 25 mph (the maximum speed permitted at any point within a possession).
- 1.10 Under the authority of deviations, Network Rail has been trialling a concept referred to as 'Work site X' under which an ES can be appointed for a portion of line between work sites and COSSs working there are 'signed in'. The most recently approved deviation, applying to the Southern Region only, has extended this to the portion of line between the detonator protection and the extreme work-site marker board (WSMB). This has the effect of removing the situation of working outside a work site. It is currently anticipated that this method of working would be introduced to the Rule Book from December 2026 which would remove any requirement to perpetuate this situation of the use of unassisted lookouts.
- 1.11 The HAZID work raised the question of the proposals for alternative 'engineering' possession limit controls which are currently planned to be incorporated in the Rule Book from December 2026 which may result in a portion of line between a protecting signal and the first WSMB falling outside the limits of the possession. This situation will require to be addressed as the proposals on future possession limit controls are developed
- 1.12 To work within a possession but outside a work site without the authority of the person in charge of the possession (PICOP). This is permitted but the warning arrangements must be based on the permissible speed on the line concerned.
- 1.13 Again, the introduction of the 'work site X' procedure would avoid the need for this arrangement. However, the arrangements are in effect the same as for a group working on an open line which it is proposed to limit more stringently, and it is proposed this arrangement should be discontinued as part of this project.

Objective 2 – To consider the continuing requirements and the rules necessary to support these

- 1.14 To allow a group under the supervision of a controller of site safety (COSS) to carry out work that does not affect the safety of the line on a running line that remains open to traffic. The conclusions of the HAZID workshops are that there is no case to continue to allow unrestricted use of these arrangements beyond December 2025, and that by adopting good practice the residual use can be eliminated by that date.
- 1.15 An issue was considered at some length during the workshops concerning depots, sidings and yards, and some earlier proposals had been made concerning the suitability of unassisted lookout working on low speed lightly trafficked freight-only lines.
- 1.16 The documented arrangements for lookout warning cannot be readily applied to a depot or siding environment, within which the intended safe system of work would be a sidings possession. Alternatives were advanced during the workshops which included such practices as working within a private siding when the boundary gate remains closed preventing any movement to or from the location. Further discussion has established that the use of lookouts relates to movements on the approach lines, particularly where there is an infrastructure manager boundary. The opinion of Maintenance Managers and Capital Delivery

representatives within Network Rail favours retention of the ability to use unassisted lookouts where a low permissible speed applies.

- 1.17 It is proposed that the use of unassisted lookouts should only be permitted where the permissible speed of approaching trains does not exceed 25 mph. Within a depot or siding the siding possession arrangements would be mandated, limiting the use of lookouts to a line from which trains could enter.
- 1.18 There was a view that this should include the approaches to large terminal and other stations, which does not seem to be acceptable as the decision as to what is an approaching train (as shown in section 6.8 of GERT8000-HB7) may involve more than one line. It is proposed that the use of lookouts would not be permitted where two or more lines lead onto the line for which the lookout is appointed. This would also restrict any application to genuinely 'low speed' running lines.
- 1.19 There is no particular justification for selecting a maximum speed of 25 mph, other than it is already used as a limiting factor in the relevant rules within a possession. It is however considered appropriate to define a relatively low speed to discourage a more liberal interpretation of acceptability.
- 1.20 Network Rail propose that a process of generic risk assessment should be undertaken to determine the acceptability of unassisted lookouts at any given location, provision for which would be made in a company instruction.
- 1.21 A group is required to walk on or near the line to access or return from a site of work without the adjacent line being blocked to traffic. The rules in force from December 2024 only permit the use of lookouts as a safe system of work if this has been authorised. The proposed limitations on the use of lookouts shown in section 1.18 would act as a further deterrent to doing so.
- 1.22 A group is to work within a work site. It is proposed that this option be withdrawn, and that the COSS would apply the same processes so far as train movements are concerned as with any other group that is signed in.
- 1.23 To work within a possession but outside a work site with the authority of the person in charge of the possession (PICOP). No change is proposed at this time, with the expectation that this will be replaced by the application of the 'Work site X' procedure.
- 1.24 To work within a possession but outside a work site without the authority of the person in charge of the possession (PICOP). It is proposed that this option be withdrawn, and that the group should work within a work site.

2. How does the content in the standard need to change to achieve the objective?

Objective 2 – To consider the continuing requirements and the rules necessary to support these

- 2.1 Changes would be proposed to section 6.8 (Safe system of work using lookouts) of GERT8000-HB7 as a result of the more limited situations under which lookouts can be used. The following sub-sections would be particularly affected:

- a) Conditions – it seems, for example, unlikely that so great a warning time as 45 seconds or the need to cross open lines to reach a position of safety would be necessary.
 - b) Deciding what is an approaching train – most situations would no longer apply.
 - c) Using distant and intermediate lookouts – Withdrawn.
 - d) Working out the required warning time – Certain factors removed.
 - e) Using lookouts during darkness, poor visibility or when on or near a tunnel – Consideration to be given whether this should continue to be permitted.
- 2.2 The sighting distance charts in GERT8000-HB7 were proposed to be simplified by excluding approach speeds above 25 mph and potentially the longer warning times. Possibly a single line of entry applying to any speed up to 25 mph would suffice. However at present, the continued use of lookout operated warning system (LOWS), and possibly other equipment warning systems, requires the higher speeds to be retained. A reduction in the maximum warning time has been considered, but these may still be necessary.
- 2.3 In GERT8000-HB3, all reference to intermediate and distant lookouts is proposed to be withdrawn.
- 2.4 In GERT8000-HB9, section 3.7 describing the use of lookout warning within a work site is proposed to be withdrawn, as is section 4.3 concerning working outside a work site without the PICOP's authority. The same changes are proposed in GERT8000-HB9 ERTMS.
- 2.5 It is proposed to withdraw section 4.7 of GERT8000-HB12 and GERT8000-HB12 ERTMS, as the use of lookouts would no longer be a safe system of work that could be agreed with a COSS.
- 2.6 Section 13 of Handbook RS521 includes an explanation of the significance of a blue and white chequered flag used for communication between lookouts which would become obsolete, and it is proposed to remove this.
- 2.7 The project has been used as an opportunity to remove reference to the obsolete competency of safe work leader (SWL) as part of the commitment to progressively do so.
- 2.8 It has been recognised that the content of GERT8000-HB9 and GERT8000-HB12 and the corresponding ERTMS handbooks is very similar. It is therefore proposed that the need for retention of the ERTMS versions or their replacement by the non-ERTMS versions is considered as part of this consultation.

3. How urgently does the change need to happen to achieve the objectives?

- 3.1 This work will reduce the current inconsistency between the Rule Book and industry practice in relation to the methods of warning and protecting staff when they are working on the infrastructure. The Network Rail Technical Authority would wish that the work is completed, and the revised documents published, as part of the planned round of Rule Book changes in September 2025. This would align with the conclusion reached by the HAZID workshops that the residual use of lookouts on open lines can be managed out by the in-force date of December 2025.

4. What are the positive and negative impacts of implementing the change?

Justification of impact, scale and quantification for the seven impact areas

A. Legal compliance and assurance

- 4.1 The Railways and Other Guided Transport Systems (Safety) Regulations 2006 (as amended) (ROGS) require that the safety management system of transport operators shows how continuous improvement of the safety management system is ensured. The changes to the Rule Book help infrastructure managers meet the requirement for continuous improvement of the safety management system. Therefore, the changes can contribute to reducing a potential breach of ROGS and demonstrate continuous improvement.
- 4.2 If a serious personal injury is caused, then a likely outcome could be being issued with a prohibition notice or prosecution and/or civil claim. The following costs could be incurred:
- a) Prosecution (average) cost/fine = £200,000 including costs
 - b) Prohibition notice (cost of stopping operations, rectification costs and reputational damage) = £50,000
 - c) Civil claim (average amount for serious claim) = £100,000 pp including costs
 - d) Total = £350,000
- 4.3 If one such incident over the course of 5 years were to occur, then a potential cost of £350,000 could be incurred. If the changes introduced contribute by 50% to avoiding this cost, then this is a total benefit of £175,000.

B. Health, safety and security

- 4.4 The RAIB investigations into the fatalities in the Margam area on 3rd July 2019 and at Surbiton on 9th February 2021 are recent examples of the risks of being struck by a train whilst working on a line open to traffic. In past years there have been other fatalities, including cases in which a lookout has been struck and fatally injured. It would be reasonable to suppose that a more restrictive regime which reduces still further the reliance on lookouts would avoid one fatality over a five-year period. Using the value of preventing a fatality of £2,467,000 would provide a benefit of that amount over the five-year period.
- 4.5 The trackside environment can present a greater propensity for slips, trips and falls. A regime in which a reduced number of staff are required to be trackside acting as lookouts, and a reduced need for move trackside to or from a position of safety when a warning is given may be expected to reduce the potential. A small reduction, assumed at 3%, in the number of injuries might be assumed. If injury data from the Safety Risk Model is used for workforce slip, trips and falls on or near the line, the fatalities and weighted injuries (FWI) is 3.6855 FWI per year. If there is a 3% reduction in risk as a result of introducing the changes, then this represents 0.1106 FWI per year. Using the Value of Preventing a Fatality (£2,467,000) this represents a benefit of £1,364,250 over five years.
- 4.6 The total health, safety and security benefit is therefore estimated at £3,831,250 over five years.

C. Reliability and operation performance

- 4.7 The reduction in use of lookout protection would be expected to
- a) Reduce the extent of operational delays following any incident.
 - b) Increase the productivity of work undertaken during access opportunities which may be limited if an incident related to walking occurs.
 - c) Reduce lost time accidents affecting availability of staff for normal work.
- 4.8 Delays due to fatalities and injuries on Network Rail infrastructure cost the industry 440,962 delay minutes in the financial year 2019/2020 at a value of £50 a minute. If 5% of these problems (22,048 delay minutes) are due to fatalities and injuries from crossing or being near the line, this represents a cost of £1,102,406. Preventing 1% of incidents by the changes saves £11,024, which, over 5 years, is equivalent to saving £55,120.

D. Design and maintenance

- 4.9 These aspects are not significantly affected by the proposed changes.

E. People, process and systems

- 4.10 As with most Rule Book changes, there are direct costs of implementation due to the need for briefing or training. It is probable that in this case the changes will be seen as sufficiently significant to require an additional level of briefing supported by enhanced briefing material. These costs will be accounted for in the project to make changes to the Rule Book.
- 4.11 Network Rail standard NR/L2/OHS/019 requires a safe work pack to be produced for activities on or near the line. It is possible that the introduction of the proposed revised rules may increase the workload involved in their development as the necessary arrangements may prove to be more complex than would be the case if lookouts were employed.

F. Environment and sustainability

- 4.12 These aspects are not significantly affected by the proposed changes.

G. Customer experience and industry reputation

- 4.13 Reduction of any impact on services attributed to incidents involving trackworkers while working would improve customer experience.
- 4.14 Reduction or elimination of high-profile accidents would reduce the possibility of reputational harm to the industry. This cannot readily be quantified.

5. What is the contribution of this standards change in realising the value to industry opportunity?

- 5.1 The changes to the Rule Book suite are considered important and essential to realising the benefits to the industry. These changes will contribute to continuous improvement of the safety management systems of infrastructure managers. It also contributes to reducing safety risks in a critical and high-profile area. In doing so there would be benefits to reliability of operations and efficiency of engineering activity.

6. What is the effort required by RSSB to make the change?

- 6.1 The project will require a lead Rail Operations Specialist and a supporting Rail Operations Specialist to provide peer review and to ensure changes are compatible with the Rule Book App. Input is also required from RSSB Policy, Risk, and Human Factors Specialists.
- 6.2 Additional effort will be required for project management, communications and development of briefing materials, and liaison with Willsons printers.

7. Can RSSB deliver against industry's expected timescales?

- 7.1 It is anticipated that the changes can be delivered in line with the project's schedule and published in September 2025 for an in-force date of December 2025, which aligns with an industry view of a realistic date for elimination of the unrestricted use of unassisted lookouts on open running lines.

8. How will the industry implement the change?

- 8.1 Implementation will require briefing and training of trackworkers and their employers. Materials will be supplied by RSSB, which will explain the key changes together with their rationale, and the need to adopt alternative methods of working where this is necessary.

9. How will RSSB assess whether the change is achieving the objectives?

- 9.1 RSSB will support the implementation of the standards through stakeholder engagement and will request feedback from users where required. In this case the changes are potentially significant, and a formal process to obtain feedback may be considered necessary.
- 9.2 RSSB will undertake a 12-month review following publication.
- 9.3 RSSB will monitor proposals for deviation and enquiries.

Appendix A. Disposition Table

Table A1: GERT8000-HB3 issue 3 to GERT8000-HB3 issue 4

From GERT8000-HB3 issue 3	To GERT8000-HB3 issue 4	Way forward	Comments	Objective
3 Site warden duties	3 Site warden duties	Revised – material change	Reference to the obsolete competency of safe work leader (SWL) has been removed.	2
4 Lookout duties - general	4 Lookout duties - general	Revised – material change	Reference to the obsolete competency of safe work leader (SWL) has been removed. Reference to the lookout's view becoming 'blocked' has been changed to 'obscured' to explain in more simple language that this refers to both stationary and moving obstructions. 'Note' amended to remove reference to distant and intermediate lookouts, which are no longer permitted, to 'pee-wee' which is no longer used, and to prohibit the use of site lookouts during darkness, poor visibility or when in or near a tunnel, which is no longer permitted,	2
5 Site-lookout duties	5 Site-lookout duties	Revised – material change	Instructions relating to distant or intermediate lookouts removed, which are no longer permitted. Reference to the obsolete competency of safe work leader (SWL) has been removed.	2
6 Distant lookout	N/A	Withdrawn	The use of distant lookouts is no longer permitted.	2
7 Intermediate lookout	N/A	Withdrawn	The use of intermediate lookouts is no longer permitted.	2

Business case for change

Table A2: GERT8000-HB7 issue 9 to GERT8000-HB7 issue 10. This table includes only those changes associated with this project, as other projects affect it.

From GERT8000-HB7 issue 9	To GERT8000-HB7 Issue 10	Way forward	Comments	Objective
5 Walking with a group 5.1 Before starting to walk with a group	5 Walking with a group 5.1 Before starting to walk with a group	Revised – material change	Using lookouts is no longer permitted as a safe system of work in this situation, as there is now little scope for doing so.	2
Section 6 Working with a group 6.8 Safe system of work using lookouts (lookout warning)	Section 6 Working with a group 6.8 Safe system of work using lookouts (lookout warning)	Revised – material change	<p>The first condition for using this method has been strengthened to say ‘No alternative safe system of work can be used’</p> <p>Use of lookouts must be planned in advance and authorised at director level.</p> <p>The permissible speed of approaching trains must not exceed 25 mph (40 km/h).</p> <p>Using an emergency or temporary speed restriction to determine the speed of trains is no longer provided for.</p> <p>No open lines can be crossed to reach a position of safety.</p> <p>Lookouts cannot be used during darkness, poor visibility or when on or near a tunnel.</p> <p>Lookouts can only be used if trains can only approach on the line being worked on or an adjacent line and cannot be routed onto that line after becoming visible.</p> <p>Reference to distant and intermediate lookouts removed, as they can no longer be used.</p> <p>The definition of an approaching train has been revised as a result of the limitations on which lines a train can approach on.</p> <p>Calculation of the required warning time has been simplified as distant and intermediate lookouts can no longer be used..</p>	2

Business case for change

From GERT8000-HB7 issue 9	To GERT8000-HB7 Issue 10	Way forward	Comments	Objective
Aid to working out warning times	Aid to working out warning times	Revised – material change	The 'Aid to working out warning times' has been amended, as distant and intermediate lookouts can no longer be used, and an emergency or temporary speed restriction can no longer be taken into account. A new sentence has been added to explain that the sighting distance charts include speeds in excess of 25 mph as these may be required when equipment warning is to be used.	2

Table A3: GERT8000-HB9 issue 8.1 to GERT8000-HB9 issue 9. This table includes only those changes associated with this project, as other projects affect it.

From GERT8000-HB9 issue 8	To GERT8000-HB9 Issue 9	Way forward	Comments	Objective
1 Definitions	1 Definitions	Revised – material change	Reference to the obsolete competency of safe work leader (SWL) has been removed.	2
3 Working within a work site 3.1 Agreeing the site of work with the ES or SWL	3 Working within a work site 3.1 Agreeing the site of work with the ES	Revised – material change	Reference to the obsolete competency of safe work leader (SWL) has been removed.	2
3.2 Agreeing the arrangements before the work site is granted	3.2 Agreeing the arrangements before the work site is granted	Revised – material change	Reference to the obsolete competency of safe work leader (SWL) has been removed.	2
3.3 Safe system of work where all lines are blocked (safeguarded)	3.3 Safe system of work where all lines are blocked (safeguarded)	Revised – material change	Reference to the obsolete competency of safe work leader (SWL) has been removed.	2

Business case for change

From GERT8000-HB9 issue 8	To GERT8000-HB9 Issue 9	Way forward	Comments	Objective
3.4 Safe system of work using a safety barrier (fenced)	3.4 Safe system of work using a safety barrier (fenced)	Revised – material change	Reference to the obsolete competency of safe work leader (SWL) has been removed.	2
3.5 Safe system of work (separated)	3.5 Safe system of work (separated)	Revised – material change	Reference to the obsolete competency of safe work leader (SWL) has been removed.	2
3.7 Safe system of work using lookouts	N/A	Withdrawn	The use of lookouts as a safe system of work is no longer permitted	2
3.8 When your safe system of work includes movements at no more than 5 mph (10 km/h)	3.7 When your safe system of work includes movements at no more than 5 mph (10 km/h)	Revised – material change	This section has been renumbered as a result of the withdrawal of section 3.7. Reference to the obsolete competency of safe work leader (SWL) has been removed.	2
3.9 When protection from the ES or SWL is no longer needed	3.8 When protection from the ES is no longer needed	Revised – material change	This section has been renumbered as a result of the withdrawal of section 3.7. Reference to the obsolete competency of safe work leader (SWL) has been removed.	2
3.10 When protection is no longer needed and the ES or SWL is to be advised by telephone	3.9 When protection is no longer needed and the ES is to be advised by telephone	Revised – material change	This section has been renumbered as a result of the withdrawal of section 3.7. Reference to the obsolete competency of safe work leader (SWL) has been removed.	2
3.11 If work is to be carried out on a rail vehicle	3.10 If work is to be carried out on a rail vehicle	Revised – material change	This section has been renumbered as a result of the withdrawal of section 3.7. Reference to the obsolete competency of safe work leader (SWL) has been removed.	2

Business case for change

From GERT8000-HB9 issue 8	To GERT8000-HB9 Issue 9	Way forward	Comments	Objective
4 Working outside a work site 4.3 Working without the PICOP's authority	N/A	Withdrawn	This method of working is no longer permitted.	2

Business case for change

Table A4: GERT8000-HB9 ERTMS issue 2 to GERT8000-HB9 ERTMS issue 3. This table includes only those changes associated with this project, as other projects affect it.

From GERT8000- HB9ERTMS issue 2	To GERT8000- HB9ERTMS Issue 3	Way forward	Comments	Objective
1 Definitions	1 Definitions	Revised – material change	Reference to the obsolete competency of safe work leader (SWL) has been removed.	2
3 Working within a work site 3.1 Agreeing the site of work with the ES or SWL	3 Working within a work site 3.1 Agreeing the site of work with the ES	Revised – material change	Reference to the obsolete competency of safe work leader (SWL) has been removed.	2
3.2 Agreeing the arrangements before the work site is granted	3.2 Agreeing the arrangements before the work site is granted	Revised – material change	Reference to the obsolete competency of safe work leader (SWL) has been removed.	2
3.3 Safe system of work where all lines are b locked (safeguarded)	3.3 Safe system of work where all lines are b locked (safeguarded)	Revised – material change	Reference to the obsolete competency of safe work leader (SWL) has been removed.	2
3.4 Safe system of work using a safety barrier (fenced)	3.4 Safe system of work using a safety barrier (fenced)	Revised – material change	Reference to the obsolete competency of safe work leader (SWL) has been removed.	2
3.5 Safe system of work using site-wardens (site-warden protected)	3.5 Safe system of work using site-wardens (site-warden protected)	Revised – material change	Reference to the obsolete competency of safe work leader (SWL) has been removed.	2
3.7 Safe system of work using lookouts	N/A	Withdrawn	The use of lookouts as a safe system of work is no longer permitted	2

Business case for change

From GERT8000- HB9ERTMS issue 2	To GERT8000- HB9ERTMS Issue 3	Way forward	Comments	Objective
3.8 When your safe system of work includes movements at no more than 5 mph (10 km/h)	3.7 When your safe system of work includes movements at no more than 5 mph (10 km/h)	Revised – material change	This section has been renumbered as a result of the withdrawal of section 3.7. Reference to the obsolete competency of safe work leader (SWL) has been removed.	2
3.9 When protection from the ES or SWL is no longer needed	3.8 When protection from the ES is no longer needed	Revised – material change	This section has been renumbered as a result of the withdrawal of section 3.7. Reference to the obsolete competency of safe work leader (SWL) has been removed.	2
3.10 When protection is no longer needed and the ES or SWL is to be advised by telephone	3.9 When protection is no longer needed and the ES is to be advised by telephone	Revised – material change	This section has been renumbered as a result of the withdrawal of section 3.7. Reference to the obsolete competency of safe work leader (SWL) has been removed.	2
4 Working outside a work site 4.3 Working without the PICOP's authority	N/A	Withdrawn	This method of working is no longer permitted.	2

Business case for change

Table A5: GERT8000-HB12 issue 10 to GERT8000-HB12 issue 11. This table includes only those changes associated with this project, as other projects affect it.

From GERT8000-HB12 issue 10	To GERT8000-HB12 Issue 11	Way forward	Comments	Objective
4 Agreeing the safe system of work with each COSS/IWA 4.7 Safe system of work using lookouts (lookout warning)	N/A	Withdrawn	This method of working is no longer permitted	2

Table A6: GERT8000-HB12 ERTMS issue 2 to GERT8000-HB12 ERTMS issue 3. This table includes only those changes associated with this project, as other projects affect it.

From GERT8000-HB12 ERTMS issue 2	To GERT8000-HB12 ERTMS Issue 3	Way forward	Comments	Objective
4 Agreeing the safe system of work with each COSS/IWA 4.7 Safe system of work using lookouts (lookout warning)	N/A	Withdrawn	This method of working is no longer permitted	2

Business case for change

Table A7: RS521 issue 8 to RS521 issue 9

From RS521 issue 8	To RS521 Issue 9	Way forward	Comments	Objective
13 Lineside handsignals	13 Lineside handsignals	Revised – material change	The blue and white chequered flag is no longer used, and the reference has been removed	2