23-012 Introducing Special Working to the Rule Book

Version:	2.3d		
Purpose:	Approval to proceed to consultation		
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Lead industry committee:	Traffic Operation and Management Standards Committee (TOM SC)	**Date:**	03 September 2024
Supporting industry committee:	Control, Command and Signalling Standards Committee (CCS SC)	**Date:**	19 September 2024

Decision

Traffic Operation and Management Standards Committee (TOM SC) is asked to:

APPROVE that the proposed revisions of GERT8000-S5 issue 13, GERT8000-M1 issue 8, GERT8000-M2 issue 8, GERT8000-TS2 issue 7, GERT8000-TW1 issue 21, GERT8000-HB5 issue 3, RS521 issue 8 and Form NR3190 3-25 are consulted on.

In approving the standard for consultation, the SC has:

DECIDED that the proposed revisions deliver the intentions of the proposal for change.

DECIDED that the proposed revisions are in a suitable state for consultation.

IDENTIFY any specific organisations or individuals to be included in the consultation.

Control, Command and Signalling Standards Committee (CCS SC) is asked to:

SUPPORT that the proposed revisions of GERT8000-S5 issue 13, GERT8000-M1 issue 8, GERT8000-M2 issue 8, GERT8000-TS2 issue 7, GERT8000-TW1 issue 21, GERT8000-HB5 issue 3, RS521 issue 8 and Form NR3190 3-25 are consulted on.

In supporting the standard for consultation, the SC has:

SUPPORTED that the proposed revisions deliver the intentions of the proposal for change.

SUPPORTED that the proposed revisions are in a suitable state for consultation.

CONSIDER whether they would still like to be involved in the project beyond the consultation.

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This business case for change has been developed to support standards committees in taking decisions related to changes to standards. It includes an assessment of the predicted impacts arising from the change.

Proposed documents

Number	Title	Issue
GERT8000-S5	Passing a signal at danger or an end of authority (EoA) without a movement authority (MA)	13
GERT8000-M1	Dealing with a train accident or train evacuation	8
GERT8000-M2	Train stopped by train failure	8
GERT8000-TS2	Track circuit block regulations	7
GERT8000-TW1	Preparation and movement of trains	21
RS521	Signals, Handsignals, Indicators and Signs Handbook	8
GERT8000-HB5	Handsignalling duties	3
Form NR3190	Emergency Special Working Ticket	2

Proposed superseded documents

Number	Title	Issue
GERT8000-S5	Passing a signal at danger or an end of authority (EoA) without a movement authority (MA)	12
GERT8000-M1	Dealing with a train accident or train evacuation	7
GERT8000-M2	Train stopped by train failure	7
GERT8000-TS2	Track circuit block regulations	6
CGERT8000-TW1	Preparation and movement of trains	20
RS521	Signals, Handsignals, Indicators and Signs Handbook	7
GERT8000-HB5	Handsignalling duties	2.1
Form NR3190	Emergency Special Working Ticket	1

Proposed documents for withdrawal

Number	Title	Issue
Form RT3184	Temporary Block Working Ticket	12-14

Summary

Background and change

Emergency special working (ESW) was introduced in 2018 as an alternative to temporary block working (TBW). TBW has remained in place and can be used in planned scenarios when signalling is affected by engineering work. ESW is only permitted in unplanned 'fault or failure' scenarios.

A Request for Help (RfH) (23-REQ-011) stated that industry believes there is an opportunity to improve consistency in operations by introducing one method of operation for planned and unplanned signalling failures currently managed through ESW or TBW. The removal of TBW from GERT8000-S5 *Passing a signal at danger or an end of authority (EoA) without a movement authority (MA)* and consequential changes to associated modules will also support the industry's drive to remove the use of detonators on the rail network.

During the last five years, ESW has been used across the network. Industry recognises that adverse incidents have taken place during ESW. It was intended that as part of this project, a review of the adverse incidents would be completed, and the outcome used to facilitate any proposed changes to GERT8000-S5 Issue 12.

Another RfH (23-REQ-46) highlighted that currently, if the 'end of ESW' board is not removed from the exit signal immediately following the withdrawal of ESW, trains must be stopped at a red signal on the approach to the sign and the driver told to disregard the sign until it is removed. This increases the risk of a signal passed at danger (SPAD). It was proposed that this project introduced a change to this instruction to reduce the number of instances of trains stopping at a signal displaying a danger aspect.

This project has proposed that a single method of operation, titled 'Extended Block Working' (EBW) replaces ESW and TBW. Learning, from previous uses of ESW, has been incorporated into the proposed changes to GERT8000-S5 Issue 12 and form NR3190 to ensure trains can continue to be moved safely and efficiently both after a signalling failure and following a return to normal working.

Industry impact due to changes

Impact areas	Scale of impact	Estimated value £ 000's
A. Legal compliance and assurance	N/A	-
B. Health, safety and security	Low	£101,055
C. Reliability and operational performance	Medium	£962,500
D. Design and maintenance	N/A	-
E. People, process and systems	Low	-
F. Environment and sustainability	N/A	-
G. Customer experience and industry reputation	Medium	-
Total value of industry opportunity =		**£1,063,554 over 5 years**

The standards change contribution to the total value of industry opportunity				
☐ None or low	☐ Minor but useful	☐ Moderate	☑ Important / essential	☐ Urgent / critical

Detail

1. What were the objectives associated with this change?

The outcomes of objective 2 and 3 of this project were dependent on the previous objective being successfully achieved.

Objective 1 – Review adverse incident data for ESW

1.1 There have been adverse incidents associated with ESW since 2018. This project carried out a review of these incidents and incorporated any learning points into the further objectives.

1.2 This project also reviewed the original risk assessment work completed prior to the introduction of ESW and identified any areas of risk that may not have been originally considered based on the findings from the adverse incident data.

Objective 2 – Introduce updated rules for Special Working to, and remove TBW and ESW rules from, GERT8000-S5

1.3 ESW has been available since 2018 as a method of operation during signalling failure. This method of operation is an alternative to TBW, to allow the industry to respond to failure situations more safely and efficiently. Planned TBW remains in place where signalling is affected by planned engineering works. After five years of ESW use across the network, the industry believes there is an opportunity to provide consistency. It was proposed to introduce a new method of operation for both planned and emergency situations based on ESW.

1.4 It was proposed that the new method of working would be given a title. For the purpose of this project, the working name 'Special Working' was used when referring to the new method. The title 'Special Working' was suggested in RfH as the planned method will no longer be solely *Emergency* Special Working. It was identified that the term 'Special Working' may already be in general use for other operational scenarios. A review of the use of the term 'Special Working' in general railway use was carried out as part of the process of deciding on the appropriate title to be used.

Objective 3 – Investigate the feasibility of developing rules to split Special Working block sections.

1.5 There was previously the ability during TBW to split the TBW section during extensive signalling failures. This is not a process currently available in ESW. It was proposed that the project investigated a method of splitting sections during Special Working.

Objective 4 – Remove the requirement to stop and caution trains between the withdrawal of ESW and removal of the 'end of ESW' sign.

1.6 Within GERT8000 S5 issue 12 clause 5.8 there is a requirement for the signaller to stop and advise all approaching trains if the 'end of ESW' sign is still in place after ESW is withdrawn. This presents a risk of a SPAD at the signal being maintained at danger. It also presents a performance risk when the train service is recovering after a failure. Not requiring trains to stop at a red signal to communicate with the signaller may lower the SPAD risk. It was

proposed that a Global System for Mobile Communications – Railway (GSM-R) advisory broadcast be used to inform drivers, as this means that the previously used exit signal will not need to be held at danger for this purpose.

1.7 It was proposed that the drivers of approaching trains will not be required to acknowledge any advisory broadcast to demonstrate their understanding when this method is used to inform drivers that ESW is withdrawn, but signage is still in place.

2. How has the content in the standard changed to achieve the objectives?

Objective 1 – Review adverse incident data for ESW

2.1 The information obtained through the completion of objective 1 has informed the subsequent objectives for this project.

2.2 ESW data was obtained from operational logs, adverse incident reports and directly from staff involved in instances of ESW use. Data from staff was obtained from surveys and visits to signalling and train/freight operating company sites. The staff surveys also provided individual feedback on ESW by staff who had used ESW, both operationally and on driving and signalling simulators.

2.3 The geographical location of entrance and exit signals were identified using track maps and forward-facing video where feasible.

2.4 Examples of completed NR3190 *Emergency Special Working Ticket* were collected and reviewed, including those used when an adverse incident was reported.

Objective 2 – Introduce updated rules for Special Working to, and remove TBW and ESW rules from, GERT8000-S5

2.5 TBW and ESW have been withdrawn from GERT8000-S5 and replaced with an updated form of ESW. Changes have been made to the method of working based on the findings from objective 1.

2.6 The name Extended Block Working (EBW) has been given to the new method of working.

2.7 Introduction of EBW has necessitated consequential changes to numerous GERT8000 modules and RS521.

2.8 Form NR3190 *Emergency Special Working Ticket* has been updated based on the findings from objective 1 and has been aligned to the introduction of EBW.

Objective 3 – Investigate the feasibility of developing rules to split Special Working block sections.

2.9 A review of the current process for splitting TBW sections took place. The ability to split sections during TBW was enabled by a handsignaller being able to confirm to the signaller that a train had passed through the first section ‘complete with tail lamp’. No alternative method of providing this assurance to the signaller with sufficient confidence has been identified.

Wider considerations related to this assurance were highlighted during the project development that require further work. Consequently, no process for splitting EBW has been included in GERT8000-S5 Issue 12. It was also noted that no previous use of split sections during TBW was identified during the project.

2.10 It is proposed that further work be undertaken at the earliest opportunity to look at the splitting of sections under EBW. This is likely to include additional risk and human factors work. Any proposed changes will need to be assessed alongside the implementation of EBW. The wider considerations, identified during the project, around the assurance provided to the signaller that a train had passed through the first section, and adapted instructions for operational staff will also need to be investigated.

Objective 4 – Remove the requirement to stop and caution trains between the withdrawal of ESW and removal of the 'end of ESW' sign.

2.11 New content in GERT8000-S5 will permit the use of an advisory berth triggered broadcast to be used to inform drivers while EBW signage is still present at the exit signal following the withdrawal of EBW. Where the use of a berth triggered broadcast is not possible, trains will continue to be stopped so that drivers may be informed of the presence of the signage.

3. How urgently did the change need to happen to achieve the objectives?

3.1 This project has the potential to significantly reduce delays to train services following signalling failures. Network Rail are particularly supportive of the work as an infrastructure manager and their staff at several operational levels have engaged with the project team throughout.

3.2 The changes to GERT8000-S5 provide more clarity on the roles and responsibilities of staff involved in EBW. This will allow industry to align the approach taken by operational staff and decision makers more closely with the EBW process.

3.3 This project will support the ongoing industry drive to remove detonators from operational use by removing TBW, and the consequent need to use detonators as part of the method, from GERT8000-S5.

4. What are the positive and negative impacts of implementing the change?

Justification of impact, scale and quantification for the seven impact areas

A. Legal compliance and assurance

4.1 This area is not directly applicable to the changes.

B. Health, safety and security

Objective 2 – Introduce updated rules for Special Working to, and remove TBW and ESW rules from, GERT8000-S5

4.2 There is an opportunity for a consistent approach to operations for both planned and emergency signalling outages which will reduce the need for staff to be trackside. Removal of TBW as a method of operation will remove the need for handsignallers to be exposed to trackside hazards. This will remove the associated risk of slips, trips and falls and any conflict with train movements, potentially saving the industry £27,993 over 5 years[1]. The associated road vehicle journeys made by handsignallers will no longer be required, removing this risk, and potentially saving the industry £10,788 over 5 years[2].

4.3 It was identified during the initial project work that the use of EBW vice TBW or ESW will increase the occurrences of installation and removal of the 'end of extended block working' signage, therefore, increase the overall risk for this task. However, the work in objective 1 identified 9 uses of TBW since 2018 and therefore the removal of TBW will have minimal effect on this risk.

4.4 It was identified during this project that several adverse incidents related to the exit signal had occurred during ESW. These incidents included several SPADs. SPADS contribute to 0.619 fatalities and weighted injuries (FWI) per year. A reduction to this figure because of the changes proposed in this project could save industry £75,240 over 5 years[3].

Objective 4 – Remove the requirement to stop and caution trains between the withdrawal of ESW and removal of the 'end of ESW' sign.

4.5 The use of GSM-R advisory broadcasts to warn train drivers of the signage remaining affixed to the exit signal following withdrawal of EBW will remove the requirement for trains to be stopped at a red signal for the signaller to caution the driver. This has the potential to lower the overall SPAD risk associated with EBW. The prevention of one SPAD in this scenario could save the industry £29,622 over 5 years[4].

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[1] The Safety Risk Model (SRM) v9 calculates the Total Risk (FWI) of workforce contact with a train on a running line as 0.485. A 0.5% risk reduction equates to a FWI of 0.005. The Value of Preventing a Fatality (VPF) (2022) (£2,308,000) identifies a saving to the industry of £27,993 over 5 years.

[2] SRM v9 FWI for trackworker road traffic accidents is 0.935. A 0.1% risk reduction equates to a FWI of 0.001 Using the VPF identifies a saving of £10,788 over 5 years.

[3] SPADs contribute to 0.619 fatalities and weighted injuries (FWI) per year. If the revisions to the standard were to achieve a 1% reduction in this number, then this would be equivalent to an annual benefit of £14,263[0.00619 FWI/year (1% of SPAD risk) x £2,308,000 (VPF)]

[4] Research project T1171 *Evaluation of Human Performance* listed the cost of investigating a SPAD was £29,622. This does not include any additional costs through train delays etc.

4.6 There is an industry drive to remove the use of detonators. The withdrawal of TBW and associated handsignallers will support the aim of research project T1155 *Quantified Risk Assessment of the Use of Detonators and Alternatives*. The removal of detonators can reduce the security and safety risks and costs associated with transporting detonators in road vehicles, the storage of detonators and staff training.

C. Reliability and operation performance

Objective 2 – Introduce updated rules for Special Working to, and remove TBW and ESW rules from, GERT8000-S5

4.7 It is proposed that a single method of operation replaces ESW and TBW. This will simplify the actions that need to be taken by staff and therefore lower the overall training requirements for staff. Short term costs for training staff in the use of EBW can potentially be offset against lower long term training costs for new staff on the use of a single method of operation.

4.8 With the proposed changes there will no longer be a requirement for the signaller to wait for each handsignaller to reach the designated entry and exit signals before train movements can commence. This may result in reduced train delays. Using EBW instead of TBW could save industry £962,500 over 5 years[5].

4.9 It was reported in RfH 23-REQ-011 that ESW has been used effectively across the network to deal with failure situations and to increase the throughput of trains. The use of a method of working based on ESW and the withdrawal of TBW may therefore lead to an increased throughput of trains during signalling failures. Data to further quantify this benefit was not obtained during the project. The data available on the previous uses of ESW did not accurately record the throughput of trains when ESW was in operation.

4.10 RfH 23-REQ-46 indicates the signaller stopping a train at a red signal to advise the driver that ESW has been withdrawn when the signage is still in place results in a delay of 4-6 minutes per train. Use of a GSM-R broadcast may reduce or remove this delay. The data obtained from objective 1 of the project did not enable further quantification of this benefit. This was due to the data for this type of occurrence being incomplete.

Objective 3 – Investigate the feasibility of developing rules to split Special Working block sections.

4.11 Where signalling faults or failures, or planned engineering work extend over a long distance, a method of splitting Special Working sections may increase the throughput of trains over the affected sections. Data to further quantify this benefit was not found during the project. No

[5] RSSB's *Assessment of the Risk from Emergency Special Working version 1.0* (2018) identifies average time saved to implement ESW instead of TBW is 77 minutes. Assuming number of trains per use of ESW is 10 and 50% of these trains are delayed, using train delay costs of £50 per minute, total cost saved is 77x5x50=£19,250 per implementation of ESW. Assuming ESW in used instead of TBW 10 times a year then annual savings could be £192,500.

examples of splitting sections during TBW were found, which may have provided data to aid in the quantification of potential benefits.

D. Design and maintenance

4.12 This area is not directly applicable to the changes.

E. People, process and systems

Objective 1 – Review adverse incident data for ESW

4.13 As part of this project, a review of previous adverse incidents that took place during ESW was completed. Learning from these past events has been used to develop EWB and to reduce risks during future operations.

F. Environment and sustainability

4.14 This area is not directly applicable to the changes.

G. Customer experience and industry reputation

Objective 2 – Introduce updated rules for Special Working to, and remove TBW and ESW rules from, GERT8000-S5

4.15 Signalling failures cause immediate delay that impact more than one service. Any action taken to allow trains to continue their journey as quickly and as safely as possible may potentially reduce the negative impact on the end user perception of railway performance.

5. What is the contribution of this standards change in realising the value to industry opportunity?

5.1 The removal of TBW from GERT8000-S5 will reduce the need for handsignallers to be exposed to the infrastructure and therefore reducing the risk associated with the interface between trains and people and from exposure to the elements. This will contribute towards the lowering of the risk of personal accidents network wide.

5.2 There is an industry drive to remove the use of detonators. The withdrawal of TBW and associated detonators will contribute to this aim.

5.3 Industry recognises the importance of keeping trains moving following failure to reduce associated risks caused by trapped trains or the use of alternative transport.

5.4 An increase in operational efficiency may be achieved as EBW will be able to be put in place immediately if the criterion for doing so is met. The clarity provided to the driver on the identification of the EBW exit signal and the use of berth triggered broadcasts following the withdrawal of EBW may also contribute to reducing delays to services. Advice provided by the proposed accompanying TN3301 Technical Note (TN) regarding the changes to GERT8000-S5 will also suggest approaches to increase operational efficiency while maintaining safety.

6. What was the effort required by RSSB to make the change?

6.1 The project required changes to several GERT8000 modules, an update to Form NR3190 and withdrawal of Form RT3184.

6.2 RSSB engaged with train operating companies (TOCs), freight operating companies (FOCs) and Network Rail to identify good practice and facilitated a drafting review group to input and comment on the draft documents.

6.3 RSSB held a workshop attended by Network Rail, FOC and TOC operations staff to discuss potential outputs for the project.

6.4 The project required a lead Rail Operations Specialist and a supporting Rail Operations Specialist to provide peer review. Input was also required from RSSB Policy and Risk Specialists.

6.5 RSSB created TN3301 to be published alongside the changes to GERT8000, which outlines the lessons learnt from ESW operations and the reasoning behind the proposed changes to GERT8000-S5.

6.6 Input to the communications strategy and its implementation was required from a Communications team member.

7. Can RSSB deliver against industry's expected timescales?

7.1 This project is currently scheduled for publication of documents in March 2025. The outputs of the project depended on the potential need for additional risk assessment work to be completed. Previous risk work for ESW did not consider all the potential risks applicable. Resources were available for this risk work and therefore this did not impact the project timescales.

7.2 The data on the use of TBW and ESW since 2018 was required to facilitate the review of adverse incidents under ESW. This data was requested from Network Rail and supplied in a timely manner and therefore did not impact the project timescales.

8. How will the industry implement the change

8.1 There will be a requirement for industry to brief or train staff on the introduction of EBW, depending on the level of change.

8.2 To effectively monitor implementation of EBW, the data around the use of EBW during the 12-month period following the conclusion of this project should be supplied to RSSB. An assessment of the collected data will be necessary to accurately review the implementation of EBW.

9. How will RSSB assess whether the change is achieving the objectives?

9.1 RSSB will undertake a 12-month review following publication to assess whether the content is fit for purpose. During the review, specific feedback will be sought from railway undertakings and anyone else that has adopted and implemented the changes.

9.2 RSSB will support duty holders to evaluate implementation by analysing the data that they provide after 12 months of implementation. This would be aided if Network Rail were to ensure that all incidents of implementation of EBW are recorded in the national control log, as this will create a useful indicator to follow up with the train operating company concerned and facilitate the gathering of related data.

Appendix A Disposition Table

A.1.1 Only sections that have been subject to review have been included in the disposition table. Sections not mentioned below remain unchanged.

Table A1: GERT8000-S5 Issue 12 to GERT8000-S5 Issue 13

From	To	Way forward	Comments	Objective
5 Emergency special working	5 Extended block working	Revised	Title of section updated	2
5.1 Authorising emergency special working	5.1 Authorising extended block working	Revised	Title of section updated	2
5.1 Authorising emergency special working	5.1 Authorising extended block working	Revised	Emergency special working updated to extended block working	2
5.2 Arranging emergency special working	5.2 Arranging extended block working	Revised	Emergency special working updated to extended block working	2
5.2 Arranging emergency special working	5.2 Arranging extended block working	Revised	The phrase emergency special working has been updated to extended block working throughout the section. The section has been updated to add the terms 'entrance signal' and 'exit signal'. Clearer instructions on the location of the exit signal and provision of the 'end of extended block working sign' have been added. The need for the exit signal to be easily identifiable to a driver has been moved to the exit signal location instructions.	2
5.3 Before allowing a train to enter the emergency special working section	5.3 Before allowing a train to enter the extended block working section	Revised	The phrase emergency special working has been updated to extended block working throughout the section.	2
5.4 Authorising a train to enter the emergency special working section	5.4 Authorising a train to enter the extended block working section	Revised	The phrase emergency special working has been updated to extended block working throughout the section.	2

From	To	Way forward	Comments	Objective
5.5 At the entrance signal	5.5 At the entrance signal	Revised	The phrase emergency special working has been updated to extended block working throughout the section.	2
5.5 At the entrance signal	5.5 At the entrance signal	Revised	The list of reasons following 'You must not complete an extended block working ticket if your train is to enter the section to:' has been reordered. This is to align with the common method of remembering these reasons using the first letter of each item. The first letter of each item in the reordered list now spells out the acronym 'rare'.	2
5.6 During the movement	5.6 During the movement	Revised	The list of reasons following 'You must proceed at caution if you have entered the extended block working section to: examine the line' has been reordered. This is to align with the common method of remembering these reasons using the first letter of each item. The first letter of each item in the reordered list now spells out acronym 'e-rare'.	2
5.7 When the train arrives at the exit signal	5.7 When the train arrives at the exit signal	Revised	The phrase emergency special working has been updated to extended block working throughout the section. The instruction for the driver to 'report to the signaller that your train has arrived complete' has been changed to 'report to the signaller that your train has arrived at the exit signal' This is to reflect the assurance that the driver can be expected to give to the signaller that the train is complete with tail lamp.	2
5.8 Ending emergency special working	5.8 Ending extended block working	Revised	The phrase emergency special working has been updated to extended block working throughout the section.	2
5.8 Ending emergency special working	5.8 Ending extended block working	Revised	New instructions relating to the use of a GSMR berth triggered advisory broadcast to advise drivers of the presence of the 'end of extended block working' sign following withdrawal of EBW have been added.	2

Table A2: GERT8000-M1 Issue 7 to GERT8000-M1 Issue 8

From	To	Way forward	Comments	Objective
3.1 Providing emergency protection	3.1 Providing emergency protection	Revised	Reference to temporary block working has been removed. The phrase emergency special working has been updated to extended block working.	2
3.8 Protecting your own line	3.8 Protecting your own line	Revised	Reference to temporary block working has been removed. The phrase emergency special working has been updated to extended block working.	2

Table A3: GERT8000-M2 Issue 7 to GERT8000-M2 Issue 8

From	To	Way forward	Comments	Objective
2.1 When to place emergency protection	2.1 When to place emergency protection	Revised	Reference to temporary block working section has been removed. The phrase emergency special working has been updated to extended block working.	2

Table A4: GERT8000-TS2 Issue 6 to GERT8000-TS2 Issue 7

From	To	Way forward	Comments	Objective
3.5.3 Method of signalling by bells or telephone	3.5.3 Method of signalling by bells or telephone	Revised	Instructions related to temporary block working have been removed.	2
3.5.3 Method of signalling by bells or telephone	3.5.3 Method of signalling by bells or telephone	Revised	The phrase emergency special working has been updated to extended block working.	2

Table A5: GERT8000-TW1 Issue 20 to GERT8000-TW1 Issue 21

From	To	Way forward	Comments	Objective
21 Personal equipment	21 Personal equipment	Revised	Form NR3190 Emergency Special Working Tickets updated to NR3190 Extended Block Working Tickets	2
21 Personal equipment	21 Personal equipment	Revised	New instruction added for drivers to have a means of completing Form RT3185 and Form NR3190	2

Table A6: RS521 Issue 7 to RS521 Issue 8

From	To	Way forward	Comments	Objective
12.12 End of emergency special working sign	12.12 End of extended block working sign	Revised	The phrase emergency special working has been updated to extended block working.	2

Table A7: GERT8000-HB5 Issue 2.1 to GERT8000-HB5 Issue 3

From	To	Way forward	Comments	Objective
4 When a handsignaller can be used	4 4 When a handsignaller can be used	Revised	Instructions for temporary block working have been withdrawn.	2
5 Temporary block working (TBW)	NA	Withdrawn	Instructions for temporary block working have been withdrawn.	2
6 Single line working (SLW)	5 Single line working (SLW)	Revised	Section has been renumbered following removal of TBW instructions in section 5	2
7 Telephones with limited clearance	6 Telephones with limited clearance	Revised	Section has been renumbered following removal of TBW instructions in section 5	2
8 Using tents near the line	7 Using tents near the line	Revised	Section has been renumbered following removal of TBW instructions in section 5	2

Table A8: Form NR3190 Issue 12-18 to Form NR3190 Issue 3-25

From	To	Way forward	Comments	Objective
NR3190	NR3190	Revised	The content and layout of the form has been revised based on learning from use during ESW, input from operational staff and workshops. The form now consists of Part A and Part B and the terms used align more closely with GERT8000-S5 issue 12. Additional prompts for the driver to temporarily isolate the TPWS and inform any guard on the train have been added.	2