

25-902 - National Operations Publications (NOPs) Amendments September Publication

[This page should be deleted at the publication stage of the project]

Version:	0.02		
Purpose:	Approval to proceed to development		
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Lead industry committee:	Traffic Operation and Management Standards Committee (TOM SC)	Date:	25 March 2025
Supporting industry committee:	Control, Command and Signalling Standards Committee (CCS SC)	Date:	10 April 2025
Supporting industry committee:	Rolling Stock Standards Committee (RST SC)	Date:	03 April 2025
Supporting industry committee:	Plant Standards Committee (PLT SC)	Date:	By correspondence

Decision

TOM SC is asked to:

- **APPROVE** that the proposed revisions to the Rule Book modules and handbooks below are consulted on.
In approving the Rule Book modules and handbooks for consultation the SC has:
 - DECIDED that the proposed revisions deliver the intentions of the proposal for change.
 - DECIDED that the proposed revisions are in a suitable state for consultation.
- **IDENTIFY** any specific organisations or individuals to be included in the consultation.

CCS SC, RST SC and PLT SC are asked to:

- **SUPPORT** that the proposed revisions to the Rule Book modules and handbooks are consulted on.
In supporting the Rule Book modules and handbooks for consultation the SC has:
 - SUPPORTED that the proposed revisions deliver the intentions of the proposal for change.
 - SUPPORTED that the proposed revisions are in a suitable state for consultation.
- **CONSIDER** whether they need any further involvement in the project beyond the pre-consultation stage. (NB they would still be involved in formal consultation)

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This business case for change has been developed to support standards committees in taking decisions related to changes to standards, it includes an assessment of the predicted impacts arising from the change.

Proposed revised documents

Number	Title	Issue
GERT8000-G1	General safety responsibilities and personal track safety for non-track workers	10
GERT8000-M1	Dealing with a train accident or train evacuation	8
GERT8000-M3	Managing incidents, floods and snow	5
GERT8000-P2	Working single and bi-directional lines by pilot	8
GERT8000-S5	Passing a signal at danger or an end of authority (EoA) without a movement authority (MA)	13
GERT8000-S7	Observing and obeying signalling indications. Train warning systems. Reporting signalling failures and irregularities.	7
GERT8000-T3	Possession of a running line for engineering work	13
GERT8000-TS1	General signalling regulations	19
GERT8000-TS11	Failure of, or work on, signalling equipment - signallers' regulations	8
GERT8000-TW1	Preparation and movement of trains	21
GERT8000-HB1	General duties and safety for track workers	9
GERT8000-HB7	General duties of a controller of site safety (COSS)	10
GERT8000-HB9	IWA or COSS setting up safe systems of work within possessions	9
GERT8000-HB9 ERTMS	IWA or COSS setting up safe systems of work within possessions on ERTMS lines where lineside signals are not provided	3
GERT8000-HB11	Duties of the person in charge of the possession (PICOP)	12
GERT8000-HB12	Duties of the engineering supervisor (ES) in a possession	11
GERT8000-HB12 ERTMS	Duties of the engineering supervisor (ES) in a possession on ERTMS lines where lineside signals are not provided	4
GERT8000-HB19	Work on signalling equipment - duties of the signalling technician	6
Form RT3198	Possession Arrangements Form (not available for consultation)	Dec 25
Form RT3199	Work-site Certificate (not available for consultation)	Dec 25

Business case for change

Proposed superseded documents

Number	Title	Issue
GERT8000-G1	General safety responsibilities and personal track safety for non-track workers	9.1
GERT8000-M1	Dealing with a train accident or train evacuation	7
GERT8000-M3	Managing incidents, floods and snow	4
GERT8000-P2	Working single and bi-directional lines by pilot	7
GERT8000-S5	Passing a signal at danger or an end of authority (EoA) without a movement authority (MA)	12
GERT8000-S7	Observing and obeying signalling indications. Train warning systems. Reporting signalling failures and irregularities	6
GERT8000-T3	Possession of a running line for engineering work	12
GERT8000-TS1	General signalling regulations	18.1
GERT8000-TS11	Failure of, or work on, signalling equipment - signallers' regulations	7
GERT8000-TW1	Preparation and movement of trains	20
GERT8000-HB1	General duties and safety for track workers	8
GERT8000-HB7	General duties of a controller of site safety (COSS)	9
GERT8000-HB9	IWA or COSS setting up safe systems of work within possessions	8.1
GERT8000-HB9 ERTMS	IWA or COSS setting up safe systems of work within possessions on ERTMS lines where lineside signals are not provided	2
GER8000-HB11	Duties of the person in charge of the possession (PICOP)	11
GERT8000-HB12	Duties of the engineering supervisor (ES) in a possession	10
GERT8000-HB12 ERTMS	Duties of the engineering supervisor (ES) or safe work leader (SWL) in a possession on ERTMS lines where lineside signals are not provided	3
GERT8000-HB19	Work on signalling equipment - duties of the signalling technician	5
Form RT3198	Possession Arrangements Form	Dec 20
Form RT3199	Work-site Certificate	Dec 20

Summary

Background and change

Improvements to the wording of the Rule Book have been identified from Requests for Help (RfHs), enquiries received by the Rail Safety and Standards Board (RSSB), the granting of deviations and various stakeholder comments.

By progressing changes from these various sources, it is expected that understanding and application of the content of the Rule Book will be improved, and that duty holders will have opportunities to operate more efficiently.

Certain changes previously only published in the Periodical Operating Notice (PON) and limited change releases have been included in the reissued documents.

Industry impact due to changes

Impact areas	Scale of impact	Estimated value
A. Legal compliance and assurance	Low	£35,000
B. Health, safety and security	Low	£36,000
C. Reliability and operational performance	Low	£71,400
D. Design and maintenance	N/A	
E. People, process and systems	(Medium)	(£150,000)
F. Environment and sustainability	N/A	
G. Customer experience and industry reputation	N/A	
Total value of industry opportunity =		(£7,600) over five years
The standards change contribution to the total value of industry opportunity		
<input type="checkbox"/> None or low	<input type="checkbox"/> Minor but useful	<input type="checkbox"/> Moderate
		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Important / essential
		<input type="checkbox"/> Urgent / critical

Detail

1. What are the objectives associated with this change?

Objective 1 – Moving trains after a signal has been passed at danger or an end of authority has been passed without authority – 24-REQ-037 (Module S5)

- 1.1 Section 9.3 of GERT8000-S5 allows the movement of a train after a signal has been passed at danger or an end of authority (EoA) has been passed without authority, to a more convenient location, for example to clear a junction or level crossing or to bring a train into a station. In doing so, the train must not proceed beyond another main aspect stop signal or block marker. The RfH identified that there can be more than one main aspect signal or block marker within a station platform and the extent of movement permitted may not allow a train to be fully accommodated within a station platform. The RfH identified that this may encourage self-evacuation of passengers and would also prevent the objective of clearing a junction and so avoid reactionary delay to other services.
- 1.2 The RfH proposed the removal of the constraint of not passing more than one main aspect signal or block marker, with the reference to bringing a train into a station platform by adding the word ‘fully’. As well as deterring self-evacuation a benefit was seen in reducing a PTI risk from passengers who might move in numbers towards the part of the train in the platform and potentially available for boarding. The situation of more than one signal or block marker within the same platform had been identified in the Thameslink Core and may not be widely relevant, although it was suggested that extension of ETCS may cause this to be a more general issue. In developing this proposal consideration should be given to making the proposed amendment a general one or one which applies only where Signal Box Special Instructions permit this, based on train lengths and ability to accommodate complete trains. At present the proposed amendment only makes a reference to Signal Box Special Instructions permitting a movement past a signal or block marker.

Objective 2 – Block markers or location markers obscured by dirt – 24-REQ-038 (Module S7)

- 1.3 GERT8000-S7 section 7.1 requires a driver to tell the signaller immediately, stopping the train specially if necessary, on becoming aware of a signalling failure or irregularity on any line, and lists what this may include. At present the list includes a missing block marker. The Future Rules and Standards Strategy Group (FR&SSG) has identified that this does not adequately describe instructions relating to dirty marker boards or faulty or dirty location markers and has requested the inclusion as an additional item ‘a block marker or location marker that has been obscured by dirt’. This was suggested as having the effect of making reporting clearer but having no impact on train performance. Inclusion of this item in section 7.1 requires the signaller to take no further action other than reporting the event to fault control, an action which is not prescribed but is assumed to take place with any of the scenarios in section 7.1 which are not amplified by other specific instructions, as for example a signal that is difficult to see because of light sources or foliage. In contrast to a signal, a block marker or

location marker only becomes significant during degraded situations. It may be less significant to obtain confirmation from a subsequent driver that the block marker or location marker is difficult to see and then apply any restrictions on the approach of following trains. The proposed addition would appear to be proportionate to the associated risk. In the absence of any other current references in the Rule Book to location markers, reference in this section would provide an element of future-proofing against their later inclusion.

**Objective 3 – Using the drivers’ reminder appliance (DRA) – 24-REQ-042
(Module TW1)**

- 1.4 Section 10.3 of GERT8000-TW1 requires a driver to set the DRA when stopping at a station platform entered on the authority of a single yellow aspect or caution indication; after having been authorised to pass a signal at danger or an End of Authority without a movement authority; or on the authority of a position light or subsidiary signal.
- 1.5 The Request for Help states that this does not allow for a signal that clears to a proceed aspect before the train stops in a station platform or whilst stationary there. This is said to cause confusion as to whether the DRA should be set with further confusion being caused if the signal concerned is not a platform starting signal but can be seen and drivers are not sure whether the DRA can be reset before or after station duties. The Request for Help proposes that the wording be amended to allow the DRA not to be set if the driver can confirm that the next signal is showing a proceed aspect. This Request was received before the publication of the most recent amendment to this rule which came into force in December 2024.
- 1.6 The intention was that section 10.3 should apply when the signal ahead is not visible from the stopping position, to avoid a driver overlooking the need to depart at a speed that will allow the train to be stopped at the signal ahead. If a train had been permitted to pass the previous signal at danger, it also provides a reminder of a continued necessity of proceeding at caution. The amendment in 2024 followed a stakeholder comment suggesting that this is not fully appreciated and that drivers will set the DRA even though the signal ahead can be seen and may be displaying a proceed aspect. The wording of this instruction was reviewed and the heading of the section amended to read ‘platform starting signal’ which conveys the intention.
- 1.7 The alternative, which is now being raised again, was that a reference could be included to a signal ahead that can be seen to be displaying a proceed aspect. That however is open to objection as it might result in a driver overlooking a requirement to proceed at caution from the previous signal towards the signal ahead. It is also possible that the signal ahead is at danger but a train could still proceed normally towards it. For simplicity, the reference to a platform starting signal was the only amendment that was made.
- 1.8 Whilst it is appropriate to consider this again, these points still remain valid and an industry view should be established whether the proposed amendment would provide any further benefit.

Objective 4 – Actions following an ERTMS trip – 24-REQ-044 (Module S7)

- 1.9 At the last revision of section 8.3 of GERT8000-S7, a distinction was drawn between an ERTMS trip that has been caused by a train exceeding the limit of its intended movement authority (MA) which would equate to passing a signal at danger without authority, and numerous other reasons why an MA can be shortened or withdrawn. The intention was that if the former applied, the instructions in GERT8000-S5 would apply with the signaller completing form RT3189. If the latter, those instructions in this section of GERT8000-S7 apply with the signaller completing form RT3188
- 1.10 FR&SSG has pointed out that the current wording of this section does not reflect the need for the signaller to determine at an early stage which procedure should apply and proposes that the paragraph referring to the application of the instructions in GERT8000-S5 should appear earlier in the section. As positioned at present, the requirement can be taken as the completion of form RT3188 in every case. It is also proposed to change the wording to state that form RT3188 is completed if it has been determined that the circumstances do not require form RT3189 to be completed.
- 1.11 A small change is also proposed by replacing two references to ‘tripping’ by ‘trip’ to avoid any confusion with electric traction tripping.

Objective 5 – Fires on trains – 24-REQ-054 and 25-REQ-002 (Module M1)

- 1.12 Section 4.1 of GERT8000-M1 states that a driver or guard must try to put out any fire on a train but must make sure the train is stopped immediately if it will not be possible to put the fire out ‘within a few seconds’. The requester had previously sought some clarification on the intent of the rule as it was suggested that traincrew may be led into attempting to fight fires when it is not appropriate to do so.
- 1.13 In reply it was suggested that an appropriate interpretation would be that the fire should be one which can be put out immediately, without even using any emergency equipment, such as finding some waste paper burning and being able to stamp it out, or emptying a bottle of water over it which was already in the individual’s hand. The requester agreed that this appeared suitable and proposed its adoption.
- 1.14 A second Request for Help has identified that thermal runaway in e bikes and e scooters occurs rapidly with the development of toxic fumes and leads to a fire. When a fire occurs the use of any extinguisher will prove pointless and passengers should immediately be evacuated. Instructions to this effect were proposed for inclusion in GERT8000-M1.
- 1.15 After discussions, the correctness of including reference to a specific type of event has been questioned, and the main hazard identified as being the emission of fumes, rather than the spread of fire. During consultation, industry views will be sought⁵ as to whether this change should be progressed.

Objective 6 – Granting permission to start work within a possession – 24-REQ-055 (Module T3, Handbooks 9, 9 ERTMS, 11, 11 ERTMS, 12 and 12 ERTMS)

- 1.16 In order to grant access to a work site, the Engineering Supervisor (ES) is required to contact each Controller of Site Safety (COSS) to grant them authority to start work,

which is currently verbally communicated through telephone. As detailed in GERT8000-HB9 and HB12, until each COSS has been granted authority from the ES, and the COSS has signed the work-site certificate (RT3199), teams cannot access the worksites. Similarly, each COSS relinquishes authority either by verbal communication via telephone, quoting their name, location and authority number or by physically signing the RT3199 form, which is used by the ES to manage authorisations of COSSs at work sites.

- 1.17 This process is seen as a laborious and inefficient process and results in a large amount of non-productive time being spent at possessions which can involve several COSSs, presenting a high potential for error. COSSs may also have to travel several miles to meet the ES with road accident and fatigue risk. The requirement in the Rule Book is in place to make sure the ES and COSS have reached a clear understanding of the arrangements. This can be achieved through various communication methods with the details recorded on the RT3199 without a signature and it is proposed that the wording is amended to permit this.

Objective 7 – Permission to carry out isolation activity within a possession – 24-REQ-056 (Handbooks 11 and 12, Forms RT3198 and RT3199)

- 1.18 Following an earlier request from Network Rail, the ability of an ES to permit work in connection with 25kV ac electrical isolations to commence before the work-site marker boards had been set up, and hence without the COSS concerned being formally 'signed in' with the ES. This led to reported difficulties and a deviation (22-113-DEV) was granted permitting an alternative arrangement to apply pending the development of a permanent solution. Following work carried out on Network Rail's behalf by A. D. Little the adoption of a similar arrangement on a permanent basis has been supported as being acceptable and it is now proposed to document this.
- 1.19 The arrangements proposed involve the COSSs concerned 'signing in' with the ES or PICOP using an 'Appendix' to forms RT3198 or 3199.
- 1.20 Whilst it is proposed to include a reference to any dc isolation activities in the two handbooks, no attempt is proposed to incorporate the processes contained in the Electrified Lines Instructions within the Rule Book.

Objective 8 – Definition of the term lineside – 24-REQ-051 (Module G1 and Handbook 1)

- 1.21 Section 1 of GERT8000-HB1 includes a definition of 'on the lineside' as being between the railway boundary fence and the area known as 'on or near the line'. A case has arisen where there was no fence provided, and it was argued that work being undertaken was not in a position that fell within the definition and it must be treated as being 'on or near the line'. A COSS was provided at some cost. The request is to remove the word 'fence' from the definition. This has not been an issue previously reported but is a small change which could avoid any recurrence. Whilst the request only refers to GERT8000-HB1, the same change could be made to GERT8000-G1 which is already the subject of a proposal.

Objective 9 – Taking decisions – 24-REQ-059 (Module G1)

- 1.22 GERT8000-G1 includes in section 1.1 the words ‘If there is no rule that allows or prevents you doing something you believe must be done, you must do it in the safest way you know taking into account your training and experience. This was introduced at the time of the New Approach to the Rule Book and is intended to promote informed and risk-based decision making when an operational situation is encountered. Since that date initiatives such as Operational Decision Making (ODM or “G-Force”) have encouraged a similar approach. ODM, for example, has been made known to controllers, shift signalling managers, local operations managers and mobile operations managers, who are within the wider target audience of module G1. In practice, however, there is a tendency to adopt a more cautious approach, or mechanical compliance to a rule and apply what is perceived as the most relevant published instruction, which may be disproportionate to the situation and may have the effect of increasing overall system risk, or can result in no action being taken to mitigate the effects of an incident. There is also a tendency to misinterpret a rule and mechanically apply it to a situation where it results in a risk averse approach, may not manage the actual risks presented and cause a wider system risk.
- 1.23 An expansion of the rule is proposed to provide more context of the framework within which it should be applied using wording along the lines of ‘If there is a need to adopt an alternative arrangement or rule to the ones set out in the Rule Book, you must take into account any recognised decision-making tool which your employer has told you about, the situation in which the rule is being applied and the immediate and wider system risks imported and managed by the existing rule and the alternative’. It is possible that this may have to be supplemented by some further guidance about when it might be appropriate to apply the rule, although this may duplicate or contradict some content of the decision support tool that the employer has adopted. Whilst the question has been raised so far as holders of module G1 are concerned, a similar issue may exist with holders of GERT8000-HB1, although to adopt this would require some assurance that holders are similarly familiar with decision-making tools.
- 1.24 The request points out that this should not be used as a method to not apply rules which remain fit for purpose or used retrospectively to justify a rule application error. Therefore, this may need to specify requirements for the use of the decision-making tool, including recording the rationale for not following the rule set out in the Rule Book.

Objective 10 – ERTMS degraded working – 24-REQ-064 (Module S5)

- 1.25 Currently there is no industry method of working on an ERTMS line to enable trains to pass two or more block markers at any one time under the same authority in a degraded scenario. This concept is similar to the introduction of Emergency Special Working (ESW) on a conventionally signalled railway. This would potentially allow increased throughput of trains during degraded working. Future Rules & Standards Steering Group (FR&SSG) have developed a solution to address this.
- 1.26 The proposal would apply when ERTMS signalling is failed or disconnected to the extent that trains will be required to pass two or more consecutive ends of authority (EoA) without either a full supervision (FS) or on sight (OS) movement authority (MA).

The arrangements would be similar to those under ESW with the signaller dictating an 'operational instruction' form to the driver, and the maximum speed being limited to the staff responsible ceiling speed. A significant difference however would be that the end of the degraded working section would be an EoA to which the train has been issued with an MA. This is an advantage presented by ERTMS which overcomes the difficulties of correctly identifying the end of the 'section'.

- 1.27 The anticipated benefit would be to enable the safe movement of trains to continue during degraded ERTMS scenarios. This would improve safety and performance, allowing an efficient way of moving trains through affected sections of degraded ERTMS. Although it is not essential to be able to implement the arrangements until East Coast Digital Programme (ECDP) Tranche – 4 (signals away), availability of the new rules in December 2025 would allow training to commence.

Objective 11 – Reporting a dangerous goods incident – 24-REQ-072 (Module G1 and Handbook 1)

- 1.28 An incident in Scotland involving an escape of gas from a tank container was initially observed when the train passed a trackworker who coincidentally had some understanding of dangerous goods matters and took steps to report it in line with the Rail Dangerous Goods Emergency instructions.
- 1.29 This has led to a proposal that the instructions in section 4.4 of GERT8000-G1 on reporting a dangerous goods incident should be published more widely so that an initial report using the correct procedure can be made by others observing that something is wrong, particularly holders of GERT8000-HB1 and possibly station staff holding GERT8000-SS1 although the latter should be in possession of GERT8000-G1.
- 1.30 This, it is suggested, would make the initial response to a dangerous goods incident more consistent, safer and potentially quicker.

Objective 12 – Observation by a COSS of a group at work and action when a group is to split – 24-REQ-052 (Handbooks 7 and 8)

- 1.31 This request arose following the RAIB investigation into a near miss involving two track workers in the Penkridge area. This covers two aspects, a fuller explanation of how a COSS is to monitor the activities of a group, and the action to be taken should a group be required to split. In the latter case it would be necessary to specify that a 'new' group must be under the supervision of another COSS and ceases to be the responsibility of the original COSS.
- 1.32 Subsequent to the investigation, the question has also been raised of a COSS supervising a group during darkness or poor visibility and whether different considerations should be specified.

Objective 13 – Stopping trains in an emergency – Customer Relationship Management (CRM) Enquiry CAS-07168-P4H2K0 (Module G1 and Handbook 1)

- 1.33 Section 3 of GERT8000-G1 and section 8.2 of GERT8000-HB1 both describe an arm held out horizontally when riding on a vehicle as being a method of stopping a train in

an emergency and the enquirer questioned whether it might be appropriate to apply this when not riding on a vehicle as this would be useful when only one hand is free.

- 1.34 Whilst there may be some merit in this proposal, it will be necessary to consider the extent to which this handsignal should be regarded as an emergency signal rather than one routinely given to indicate that a shunting movement controlled by handsignals should stop as shown in GERT8000-SS2. In that situation it would also be correct to use it should the person controlling the movement perceive some danger.

Objective 14 – Keeping points in a position to protect a possession or line blockage – CRM Enquiry 0061166 (Module TS11)

- 1.35 Section 1.4 of GERT8000-HB19 allows a signalling technician to ask the signaller to operate signalling equipment for testing purposes, or to ask the signaller's permission before operating it. The requirement to keep all points in a position to protect a possession (section 2.3 of GERT8000-T3) or line blockage (regulation 13.2.3 of GERT8000-TS1) is being interpreted at one location as preventing any movement of them for testing purposes during work or failures.
- 1.36 There is no instruction to signallers that balances the signalling technician's instructions in GERT8000-HB19 and to overcome this it is proposed to introduce a balancing instruction to GERT8000-TS11. This should include a reference to restoring the points afterwards to the required position, in a similar way to the reference to this in section 4.4 of GERT8000-T3 concerning points that have been operated to allow a train to enter a possession at an intermediate point.

Objective 15 – Operating and securing points prior to the arrival of a points operator – Stakeholder observation (Handbook 19)

- 1.37 Regulation 14.3.1 of GERT8000-TS11 allows a signaller to tell a signalling technician to operate and secure defective power-operated points before a points operator or route-setting agent arrives. There is no corresponding instruction in GERT8000-HB19 for the signalling technician. As a result, there has been a suggestion that the signalling technician should be carrying out the duties shown in GERT8000-HB4 for points operators or route-setting agents. This handbook does not apply in this situation as this is a case of a single operation of the failed points rather than successive operation to allow train movements to continue.
- 1.38 To remove any ambiguity as to the role of a signalling technician when asked to operate and secure points prior to the arrival of a points operator, it is proposed to add an item to GERT8000-HB19 to correspond to GERT8000-TS11 regulation 14.3.1.

Objective 16 – Position-light signal associated with a protecting signal – Stakeholder observation (Module TS1)

- 1.39 The question has been raised whether a position-light signal associated with a main aspect is regarded as a different signal from that when the main aspect is used as a protecting signal. If additional protection for a line blockage is by means of a track-circuit operating device T-COD (for example), the main aspect may be held at danger, but not the position-light.

Business case for change

- 1.40 To provide clarity, there may be a need to state that a signal must not be used as a protecting signal if an associated position-light can be cleared with the main aspect at danger. This will require careful consideration as there may be unintended consequences of a general prohibition and a similar question may apply to semaphore subsidiary/shunting signals. The question may require particular consideration where alternative protection limit controls are used.

Objective 17 – First train over the affected portion of line after a possession – Stakeholder observation (Module T3)

- 1.41 Section 8.5 of GERT8000-T3 requires a signaller to watch specially the operation of track circuits during the passage of the first train over a portion of line that has been under possession, not to allow a second train to follow unless a controlled signal has been placed to danger behind the first train on a track circuit block line, or where there are intermediate block signals, not to clear the section signal for a second train until the first train has arrived at the signal box ahead.
- 1.42 Those situations appear to relate to the possibility of a second train passing an automatic signal or intermediate block home signal at danger on the driver's own authority and hence reaching a location where irregular operation of track circuits will not prevent the train proceeding towards the first train.
- 1.43 Neither of these situations is now permitted (unless possibly by signal box special instructions) and the requirements of section 8.5 can result in some delay where a second train follows closely after the first train after a possession has been given up. The requirements have become obsolete and it is proposed that rather than a controlled signal intervening this could also be a signal that the signaller is keeping at danger by means of an emergency replacement control that can be relied upon, and the restriction concerning an intermediate block home signal can be removed completely.

Objective 18 – Rail adhesion – resuming normal working – Stakeholder observation (Module TW1)

- 1.44 Section 28.4 of GERT8000-TW1 is entitled 'Resuming normal working' although the first paragraph relates to the need to continue to advise drivers about reportable railhead conditions. This advice can be verbal or by means of an acknowledged GSM-R broadcast. The first paragraph of section 28.4 states that the signaller must continue to advise drivers until told this is being done by other means. As section 28 makes no provision for any other method of advice, this paragraph appears to be incorrect and it is proposed that it be withdrawn.

Objective 19 – Trains being cautioned for suspected track defects – Stakeholder observations (Module TS1)

- 1.45 It is probable that there is an anomaly within regulation 20 of GERT8000-TS1. Regulation 20.2 requires that during the time a train is examining a line, the driver of any train on a line immediately next to that line must be instructed to pass the affected portion of line at caution, until the examining train has passed clear of the affected portion of line. After examination has been completed, it may be possible for trains on any line to proceed normally. However, when a train can be used to examine

a line for a suspected track defect, regulation 20.5 requires any subsequent train over the affected line to proceed at no more than 20 mph until a competent engineer has confirmed that the line concerned is safe for normal operation. This is based on the possibility that although the driver of an examining train may not have detected any issues, a track engineer may do so, and it would not be appropriate to allow operation at normal speed over the affected line until some assurance has been given that there is no possibility of derailment. As that might pose some risk to a train on a line immediately next to the affected line, there would be some merit in applying the caution arrangement from regulation 20.2 until the competent engineer's confirmation has been received.

- 1.46 It was observed at TOM SC that the basis of continued cautioning on an adjacent line must be that the initial report of a defect suggests a credible risk of secondary collision as a result of the track defect, as this is the hazard that would be mitigated. It is not clear whether a signaller would be able to form an effective judgement on this, and it is not now proposed to make any change to this instruction unless there is clear industry support for doing so.
- 1.47 A further observation has been made concerning regulation 17.1.2 in GERT8000-TS1 which states that following a report of broken, distorted or damaged rails, or of two broken fishplates, the authority to advise that because the defect has been repaired the normal speed of trains can be resumed must come from a rail defect examiner (RDE). It has been established that Network Rail track standards permit those holding other competencies are permitted to do so. It is therefore proposed to replace the term 'RDE' by 'competent person' in the interests of accuracy.

Objective 20 – Definition of flood water – Stakeholder observation (Module M3)

- 1.48 Section 4.2 of GERT8000-M3 refers to the conditions for allowing trains to pass through flood water as being that the flood water is 'still, has not dislodged any ballast and is unlikely to dislodge any ballast', the word 'still' being a recommendation of the Plain English Campaign. This does not convey the intended meaning correctly in the way that the previous wording did, and it is proposed to revert to an equivalent of the former wording and to refer to flood water that is 'not moving and not likely to dislodge any ballast, and has not dislodged any ballast'. This would in fact be consistent with two of the items of information that the previous paragraph of section 4.2 requires the signaller to establish. It is the possible dislodgement of ballast that is significant, rather than whether the water is 'still'. For example, flood water may be draining under the formation without affecting its integrity.

Objective 21 – Working of single and bi-directional lines by pilot – 24-REQ-074 (Module P2)

- 1.49 Section 1.2 of GERT8000-P2 defines the situations in which it is not necessary to appoint a pilot for a single or bi-directional line. It has been suggested that this is particularly difficult to follow in its current format and causes confusion, with an opportunity to simplify the section to improve understanding. The benefits envisaged were removal of ambiguity and reduced potential for error. The Request includes an alternative format that it is proposed to adopt.

Business case for change

- 1.50 A second issue raised is that a reason for introducing working by pilot is that for a variety of reasons ‘the signal’ leading to the single or bi-directional line cannot be cleared. Any train entering the line where pilot working is in force requires to be authorised to pass the signal at danger, although in practice it may only be the signal at one end of the section that cannot be cleared. It is therefore proposed that the signaller should clear the signal if able to do so.
- 1.51 By taking advantage of the interlocking, the risk of failing to set the route correctly is removed, which has led on a number of occasions to points being run through at the entry to the single line. The signaller’s task is also simplified by not having to apply the arrangements for authorising a signal to be passed at danger. The Request considers the risk of a train being allowed to proceed incorrectly but concludes that the requirement for the pilot to be present makes the clearing of the signal a similar risk to that of a movement in the right direction during single line working, and gives a greater degree of consistency between the two methods of working.

Objective 22 – Defective, missing or obscured whistle boards – 24-REQ-076 (Module S7)

- 1.52 GERT8000-S7 contains no specific actions for a signaller in relation to trains after a whistle board has been reported as defective, missing or obscured. There is however a Network rail Standard (NR/L2/XNG/202) which states that anyone reporting this situation must arrange for the signaller to caution trains. In this case there is an engineering expectation that operational measures should be applied. So far as passive level crossings are concerned, the whistle board, where provided, is a key element in providing adequate warning to the level crossing user, and if in its absence the horn was not sounded a key mitigation would be lost. It is therefore proposed that a requirement be introduced to advise drivers of approaching trains and remind them of the need to sound the horn at the appropriate location.
- 1.53 Standards Committees have commented that any change must indicate that it applies to whistle boards associated with level crossings, which was the original intention. The effectiveness of the proposed change does however require careful consideration, as the board is used as a marker point, and its precise location may not be readily recalled. Equally, there is no readily available information as to the provision of whistle boards or the crossing they apply to.

Objective 23 – Authority for movements within possessions – CRM CAS-07473-T9N5P9)

- 1.54 Section 8.1 of GERT8000-HB11 and section 6.1 of GERT8000-HB12 allow a Person in charge of the possession (PICOP) or Engineering supervisor (ES) to make use of a competent person to pass instructions concerning train movements to drivers of engineering trains or on-track machines. This is balanced by a corresponding reference in sections 9.1 b) and c) of GERT8000-T3 addressed to drivers. Section 9.6 however refers only to the PICOP or ES being allowed to permit a driver to pass a signal at danger within the possession and an enquirer has identified that a doubt may exist whether such an instruction can be included within one passed through a competent person. Whilst this may be considered to be a matter conveyed through competency

processes, a minor amendment to section 9.6 would remove any ambiguity and it is proposed to make this change.

2. How does the content in the standard need to change to achieve the objective?

Objective 1 - Moving trains after a signal has been passed at danger or an end of authority has been passed without authority – 24-REQ-037 (Module S5)

- 2.1 The wording of GERT8000-S5 would require amendment to give effect to the change requested.

Objective 2 - Block markers or location markers obscured by dirt – 24-REQ-038 (Module S7)

- 2.2 The wording of GERT8000-S7 would require amendment to give effect to the change requested.

Objective 3 - Using the drivers' reminder appliance (DRA) – 24-REQ-042 (Module TW1)

- 2.3 The wording of GERT8000-TW1 would require amendment to give effect to the change requested.

Objective 4 - Actions following an ERTMS trip – 24-REQ-044 (Module S7)

- 2.4 The wording of GERT8000-S7 would require amendment to give effect to the change requested.

Objective 5 - Fires on trains – 24-REQ-054 and 25-REQ-002 (Module M1)

- 2.5 The wording of GERT8000-M1 would require amendment to give effect to the change requested.

Objective 6 - Granting permission to start work within a possession – 24-REQ-055 (Module T3, Handbooks 9, 9 ERTMS, 11, 11 ERTMS, 12 and 12 ERTMS)

- 2.6 The wording of GERT8000-T3, HB9, HB9 ERTMS, HB11, HB11 ERTMS, HB12 and HB12ERTMS would require amendment to give effect to the change requested.

- 2.7 No changes were found necessary to GERT8000-HB11, GERT8000-HB11 ERTMS or GERT8000-T3.

- 2.8 Reference to the obsolete competency of safe work leader (SWL) has been removed from GERT8000-HB12 ERTMS in line with the commitment to do so progressively

Objective 7 - Permission to carry out isolation activity within a possession – 24-REQ-056 (Handbooks 11 and 12, Forms RT3198 and RT3199)

- 2.9 The wording of GERT8000-HB11 and HB12, Form RT3198 and Form RT3199) would require amendment to give effect to the change requested.

Objective 8 - Definition of the term lineside – 24-REQ-051 (Module G1 and Handbook 1)

- 2.10 The wording of GERT8000-HB1 would require amendment to give effect to the changes requested.

Objective 9 - Taking decisions – 24-REQ-059 (Module G1)

- 2.11 The wording of GERT8000-G1 would require amendment to give effect to the change requested.

Objective 10 - ERTMS degraded working – 24-REQ-064 (Module S5)

- 2.12 The wording of GERT8000-S5 would require amendment to give effect to the change requested.

Objective 11 - Reporting a dangerous goods incident – 24-REQ-072 (Module G1 and Handbook 1)

- 2.13 The wording of GERT8000-HB1 would require amendment to give effect to the change proposed. Having done so, the wording was ambiguous as it failed to specify that something must be observed wrong with a train, and GERT8000-G1 is proposed to be similarly amended.

Objective 12 - Observation by a COSS of a group at work and action when a group is to split – 24-REQ-052 (Handbooks 7 and 8)

- 2.14 The wording of GERT8000-HB7 would require amendment to give effect to the change proposed.
- 2.15 It has not been found necessary to make any changes to GERT8000-HB8, as the changes made to GERT8000-HB7 would apply in any situation in which a COSS is working with a group.

Objective 13 - Stopping trains in an emergency – Customer Relationship Management (CRM) Enquiry CAS-07168-P4H2K0 (Module G1 and Handbook 1)

- 2.16 The wording of GERT8000-G1 and GERT8000-HB1 would require amendment to give effect to the change proposed.
- 2.17 No changes have been made, pending any industry views on the value of the proposed change.

Objective 14 - Keeping points in a position to protect a possession or line blockage – CRM Enquiry 0061166 (Module TS11)

- 2.18 The wording of GERT8000-TS11 would require amendment to give effect to the change proposed.

Objective 15 - Operating and securing points prior to the arrival of a points operator – Stakeholder observation (Handbook 19)

- 2.19 The wording of GERT8000-HB19 would require amendment to give effect to the change proposed.

Objective 16 - Position-light signal associated with a protecting signal – Stakeholder observation (Module TS1)

- 2.20 The wording of GERT8000-TS1 would require amendment to give effect to the change proposed.

Objective 17 - First train over the affected portion of line after a possession – Stakeholder observation (Module T3)

- 2.21 The wording of GERT8000-T3 would require amendment to give effect to the change proposed.
- 2.22 A similar situation applies following a line blockage and GERT8000-TS1 is proposed to be amended similarly.

Objective 18 - Rail adhesion – resuming normal working – Stakeholder observation (Module TW1)

- 2.23 The wording of GERT8000-TW1 would require amendment to give effect to the change proposed.

Objective 19 - Trains being cautioned for suspected track defects – Stakeholder observations (Module TS1)

- 2.24 The wording of GERT8000-TS1 would require amendment to give effect to the change proposed.

Objective 20 - Definition of flood water – Stakeholder observation (Module M3)

- 2.25 The wording of GERT8000-M3 would require amendment to give effect to the change proposed.

Objective 21 - Working of single and bi-directional lines by pilot – 24-REQ-074 (Module P2)

- 2.26 The wording of GERT8000-P2 would require amendment to give effect to the change proposed.

Objective 22 - Defective, missing or obscured whistle boards – 24-REQ-076 (Module S7)

- 2.27 The wording of GERT8000-S7 would require amendment to give effect to the change proposed.

Objective 23 - Authority for movements within possessions – CRM CAS-07473-T9N5P9)

- 2.28 The wording of GERT8000-T3 would require amendment to give effect to the change proposed.

3. How urgently does the change need to happen to achieve the objectives?

- 3.1 The changes will be incorporated within the September 2025 Rule Book amendments (in force December 2025).

4. What are the positive and negative impacts of implementing the change?

Justification of impact, scale and quantification for the seven impact areas

A. Legal compliance and assurance

- 4.1 The Railways and Other Guided Transport Systems (Safety) Regulations 2006 (as amended) (ROGS) require that the safety management system of transport operators shows how continuous improvement of the safety management system is ensured. The changes to the Rule Book help transport operators meet the requirement for continuous improvement of the safety management system. Therefore, the changes can contribute to reducing a potential breach of ROGS and demonstrate continuous improvement.
- 4.2 If a serious personal injury is caused, then a likely outcome could be issued with a prohibition notice or prosecution and/or civil claim. The following costs could be incurred:
- Prosecution (average) cost/fine = £200,000 including costs
 - Prohibition notice (cost of stopping operations, rectification costs and reputational damage) = £50,000
 - Civil claim (average amount for serious claim) = £100,000 pp including costs
- Total = £350,000
- 4.3 If one such incident over the course of 5 years were to occur, then a potential cost of £350,000 could be incurred. If the changes introduced contribute by 10% to avoiding this cost, then this is a total benefit of £35,000.

B. Health, safety and security

- 4.4 The new or revised instructions it is proposed to introduce are not considered to introduce significantly different working practices or significantly increase workloads for the relevant roles. In all cases, they improve application of existing instructions; promote consistency and alignment with instructions elsewhere; and/or introduce actions which enhance existing objectives or address an operational scenario not covered in existing instructions.
- 4.5 Generally, increased clarity around the rules would be expected to result in improved safety given that any confusion should be removed. A lack of clarity can give rise to miscommunication. The risk of injury from incidents due to miscommunication (the closest cause precursor from the Safety Risk Model) is 0.05891 FWI per year. If there is a 6% reduction in risk as a result of introducing the Rule Book changes, then this represents 0.002946 FWI per year. Using the Value of Preventing a Fatality (£2,467,000) this represents a benefit of £36,338 over five years, rounded to £36,000 for the purposes of this estimate.

C. Reliability and operation performance

- 4.6 Increased clarity around the rules would be expected to result in improved reliability and operational performance given that any confusion should be removed. Considering the benefits of this in terms of delay minutes, it seems reasonable to take a conservative estimate that updating the Rule Book might prevent 0.02% of delays caused by operator error (as a result of confusion with the rules). Using delay data from 2019-2020, operator (driver and signaller, including ERTMS) error accounted for a total of 1,427,546 delay minutes. A 0.02% reduction would prevent 285.5 delay minutes per year. At an average cost of £50 per delay minute, this is a benefit of around £14,280 per year, or £71,400 over 5 years.

D. Design and maintenance

- 4.7 This area is not directly applicable to the changes.

E. People, process and systems

- 4.8 As with most Rule Book changes, there are direct costs of implementation due to the need for briefing or training. However, it is not anticipated that, for most of these changes, any more detailed briefing and training is necessary than what would normally be required for Rule Book updates to address inconsistencies, ambiguities or omissions.
- 4.9 As an indication of the cost of purchase of Rule Book modules and handbooks, recent reissues of modules TW1 and TW5 generated total sales of 45,853 copies at a cost of £80,956. A considerable number of sales will be generated from this year's changes because a number of projects apart from this one are expected to result in handbooks or modules being reissued. In view of probable further migration to use of the Rule Book App which will reduce the number of sales, a cost to industry of £150,000 has been estimated. Over five years, this is a one-off cost in year one.

F. Environment and sustainability

- 4.10 This area is not directly applicable to the changes.

G. Customer experience and industry reputation

- 4.11 No significant and specifically quantifiable benefits or disbenefits relating to 'customer experience and industry reputation' are expected to be realised as a result of these changes.

5. What is the contribution of this standards change in realising the value to industry opportunity?

- 5.1 The changes to the Rule Book suite are considered important and essential to realising the benefits to the industry. Despite the cost of purchasing reissued Rule Book modules and handbooks producing a net disbenefit of £9,600 over five years, this change still contributes to continuous improvement of the safety management systems of railway undertakings and infrastructure managers. It also contributes to reducing safety risks and improved reliability and operational performance.

6. What is the effort required by RSSB to make the change?

- 6.1 The project is anticipated to require a leading Rail Operations Specialist and a supporting Rail Operations Specialist to provide peer review and to ensure changes are compatible with the Rule Book App. Input will also be required from RSSB Policy, Risk, and Human Factors Specialists. Assistance from the Marketing team will be necessary for production of revised illustrations.
- 6.2 Additional effort will be required for project management, communications and development of briefing materials, and liaison with Willsons printers.

7. Can RSSB deliver against industry's expected timescales?

- 7.1 The changes are expected to be delivered in line with the project's schedule which is to publish in September 2025 for an in-force date of December 2025.

8. How will the industry implement the change?

- 8.1 By training / briefing operating staff using materials supplied by RSSB.

9. How will RSSB assess whether the change is achieving the objectives?

- 9.1 RSSB will support implementation of the standards through stakeholder engagement and will request feedback from users where required.
- 9.2 RSSB will undertake a 12-month review following publication.
- 9.3 RSSB will monitor proposals for deviation and enquiries.

Business case for change

Appendix A. Disposition Table

Table A1: GERT8000-G1 issue 9.1 to GERT8000-G1 issue 10

From GERT8000-G1 issue 9.1	To GERT8000-G1 issue 10	Way forward	Comments	Objective
1 General instructions 1.1 Rules, regulations and instructions	1 General instructions 1.1 Rules, regulations and instructions	Revised – material change	New paragraph on what to take into consideration when adopting an alternative rule or arrangement.	9
4 Accidents 4.4 Reporting a dangerous goods incident	4 Accidents 4.4 Reporting a dangerous goods incident	Revised – material change	Reworded to remove ambiguity.	11
6 Trackside definitions	6 Trackside definitions	Revised – material change	The definition of 'The lineside' has been changed to refer to the 'boundary' rather than 'boundary fence' as there is not always a fence.	8

Table A2: GERT8000-M1 issue 7 to GERT8000-M1 issue 8. This table includes only those changes arising from this project, as another project also affects this module.

From GERT8000-M1 issue 7	To GERT8000-M1 Issue 8	Way forward	Comments	Objective
4 Fire on a train 4.1 Stopping the train	4 Fire on a train 4.1 Stopping the train	Revised – material change	The wording concerning putting out a fire has been changed to explain more clearly whether any attempt should be made. A new instruction has been included concerning a thermal runaway on an e-bike or e-scooter, in which case passengers must be moved away from the affected area.	5

Business case for change

Table A3: GERT8000-M3 issue 4 to GERT8000-M3 issue 5.

From GERT8000-M3 issue 4	To GERT8000-M3 Issue 5	Way forward	Comments	Objective
4 Flood, flowing or pooling water 4.2 Train running	4 Flood, flowing or pooling water 4.2 Train running	Revised – material change	The wording has been changed to correctly explain the conditions that must apply. The flood water must be ‘not moving and likely to have dislodged any ballast’, rather than being ‘still’.	20

Table A4: GERT8000-P2 issue 7 to GERT8000-P2 issue 8. This table includes only those changes arising from this project, as another project also affects this module.

From GERT8000-P2 issue 7	To GERT8000-P2 Issue 8	Way forward	Comments	Objective
1 When working by pilot must be introduced 1.1 Circumstances	1 When working by pilot must be introduced 1.1 Circumstances	Revised – material change	To explain the circumstances more accurately, the wording has been changed to say that the token instrument has failed, and a token is not available.	20
1.2 Exceptions	1.2 Exceptions	Revised – material change	In three cases the wording has been changed to refer to both single and bi-directional lines as the same circumstances can apply.	20
3 During working by pilot 3.1 Authority for movements	3 During working by pilot 3.1 Authority for movements	Revised – material change	A new sub-section c) has been added to state that a signaller who can clear a signal leading to the single line, or issue an MA, must do so. This helps to make sure that the route has been correctly set.	20
3.2 Pilot instructing drivers	3.2 Pilot instructing drivers	Revised – material change	As the signaller is now instructed to clear the signal, or issue an MA, when possible, the pilot only instructs a driver to pass the signal at danger or pass an EoA without an MA when this is necessary.	20

Business case for change

Table A5: GERT8000-S5 issue 12 to GERT8000-S5 issue 13. This table includes only those changes arising from this project, as another project also affects this module.

From GERT8000-S5 issue 12	To GERT8000-S5 issue 13	Way forward	Comments	Objective
9 Driver passing a signal at danger or an EoA without authority 9.3 Signaller's actions	9 Driver passing a signal at danger or an EoA without authority 9.3 Signaller's actions	Revised – material change	A train being moved to a more convenient location can be permitted to pass a main aspect stop signal or block marker, if his is permitted in the Signal Box Special Instructions.	1
N/A	10 ERTMS degraded working	New	This is a completely new section describing this method of working.	10

Table A6: GERT8000-S7 issue 6 to GERT8000-S7 issue 7.

From GERT8000-S7 issue 6	To GERT8000-S7 Issue 7	Way forward	Comments	Objective
7 Reporting signalling failures and irregularities 7.1 Signalling equipment	7 Reporting signalling failures and irregularities 7.1 Signalling equipment	Revised – material change	A new instruction has been included to report a block marker or location marker that is dirty.	2
N/A	7.3 Whistle boards associated with level crossings	New	New instructions have been introduced for situations when these are reported as missing, defective, or difficult to see.	22
7.3 Signals difficult to see because of sunlight, street lights or reflections	7.4 Signals difficult to see because of sunlight, street lights or reflections	Revised – material change	This section has been renumbered as a result of introducing a new section 7.3.	22
7.4 Signals difficult to see because of trees, foliage or other obstructions	7.5 Signals difficult to see because of trees, foliage or other obstructions	Revised – material change	This section has been renumbered as a result of introducing a new section 7.3.	22

Business case for change

From GERT8000-S7 issue 6	To GERT8000-S7 Issue 7	Way forward	Comments	Objective
7.5 Signals, lineside boards or signs becoming difficult to see because of trees, foliage or other obstructions	7.6 Signals, lineside boards or signs becoming difficult to see because of trees, foliage or other obstructions	Revised – material change	This section has been renumbered as a result of introducing a new section 7.3.	22
7.6 Shunting movements	7.7 Shunting movements	Revised – material change	This section has been renumbered as a result of introducing a new section 7.3.	22
7.7 ERTMS failures or irregularities	7.8 ERTMS failures or irregularities	Revised – material change	This section has been renumbered as a result of introducing a new section 7.3.	22
7.8 Reporting a signal/AWS/ERTMS/TP WS failure or irregularity	7.9 Reporting a signal/AWS/ERTMS/TP WS failure or irregularity	Revised – material change	This section has been renumbered as a result of introducing a new section 7.3.	22
8 ERTMS failures or irregularities 8.3 Train receiving a trip	8 ERTMS failures or irregularities 8.3 Train receiving a trip	Revised – material change	Reworded to show the intended sequence of events, which is to determine whether the trip resulted from an unauthorised exceedance of a movement authority or not, and then follow the process in module S5 or module S7. The term ‘tripping’ replaced by ‘trip’ to avoid ambiguity with electrical tripping.	4

Business case for change

Table A7: GERT8000-T3 issue 12 to GERT8000-T3 issue 13.

From GERT8000-T3 issue 12	To GERT8000-T3 issue 13	Way forward	Comments	Objective
8 Resuming normal working 8.5 First train over the affected portion of line	8 Resuming normal working 8.5 First train over the affected portion of line	Revised – material change	<p>The requirement in sub-section b) to keep a controlled signal at danger against a second train until the first train on a TCB line has passed clear was based on a driver being able to pass an automatic signal at danger. Now this no longer applies, the signal kept at danger can be an automatic signal with replacement facilities that can be relied upon, and this is now permitted, to give additional operational capability in this situation.</p> <p>Similarly, the requirement (sub-section d)) not to allow a second train from a section signal to an intermediate block home signal has been removed.</p>	17
9 Driver's duties 9.6 During the movement	9 Driver's duties 9.6 During the movement	Revised – material change	<p>Sub-section b) has been amended to say that the authority to pass a signal or block marker can be given by a competent person on the PICOP's or ES's behalf. This has been shown in GERT8000-HB11 and GERT8000-HB12, but the absence of a balancing instruction to the driver has meant that this has not been apparent to a driver.</p>	2

Table A8: GERT8000-TS1 issue 18.1 to GERT8000-TS1 issue 19.

From GERT8000-TS1 issue 18.1	To GERT8000-TS1 issue 19	Way forward	Comments	Objective
13 Safety of personnel 13.2 COSS, IWA or PC blocking a line 13.2.2 Agreeing the arrangements	13 Safety of personnel 13.2 COSS, IWA or PC blocking a line 13.2.2 Agreeing the arrangements	Revised – material change	<p>A main aspect signal must not be used as a protecting signal for a line blockage if an associated position-light signal can be cleared towards the route for which the main aspect signal is being kept at danger. This would defeat the purpose of keeping that signal at danger.</p>	16
13.2.8 First train over the affected portion of line when the work has affected the safety of the line	13.2.8 First train over the affected portion of line when the work has affected the safety of the line	Revised – material change	<p>The requirement to keep a controlled signal at danger against a second train until the first train on a TCB line has passed clear was based on a driver being able to pass an automatic signal at danger. Now this no longer applies, the signal kept at danger can be an automatic signal with replacement facilities that can be relied upon, and this is now permitted, to give additional operational capability in this situation.</p>	17

Business case for change

From GERT8000-TS1 issue 18.1	To GERT8000-TS1 issue 19	Way forward	Comments	Objective
17 Broken rails and bridge strikes 17.1.2 Authority to run trains	17 Broken rails and bridge strikes 17.1.2 Authority to run trains	Revised – material change	Track engineering standards permit persons other than rail defect examiners to authorise the normal working of trains to be resumed and in the interests of accuracy the wording has been changed to state that a competent person can do so.	19

Table A9: GERT8000-TS11 issue 7 to GERT8000-TS11 issue 8.

From GERT8000-TS11 issue 7	To GERT8000-TS11 issue 8	Way forward	Comments	Objective
1 General 1.4 Signaller's responsibilities	1 General 1.4 Signaller's responsibilities	Revised – material change	Balancing instruction to GERT8000-HB19 has been added to refer to signalling technician requiring to operate a control or equipment for test purposes. New instruction included in this to refer to points protecting a line blockage or possession being returned to the agreed position afterwards.	14

Table A10: GERT8000-TW1 issue 20 to GERT8000-TW1 issue 21. This table includes only those changes arising from this project, as another project also affects this module.

From GERT8000-TW1 issue 20	To GERT8000-TW1 issue 21	Way forward	Comments	Objective
10 Driver's reminder appliance (DRA) 10.3 When stopping at a station platform where no platform starting signal is provided	10 Driver's reminder appliance (DRA) 10.3 When stopping at a station platform where no platform starting signal is provided	Revised – material change	A new instruction has been added that the DRA does not have to be set if the main aspect or stop signal ahead can be seen to be displaying a proceed aspect or clear indication	3
28 Rail adhesion 28.4 Resuming normal working	28 Rail adhesion 28.4 Resuming normal working	Revised – material change	An incorrect reference to cease cautioning drivers once they are being advised by other means has been removed.	18

Business case for change

Table A11: GERT8000-HB1 issue 8 to GERT8000-HB1 issue 9.

From GERT8000-HB1 issue 8	To GERT8000-HB1 issue 9	Way forward	Comments	Objective
1 Definitions	1 Definitions	Revised – material change	The definition of ‘The lineside’ has been changed to refer to the ‘boundary’ rather than ‘boundary fence’ as there is not always a fence.	8
6 Reporting an accident	6 Reporting an accident or dangerous goods incident	Revised – material change	The title has been changed as a result of the introduction of new section 6.2. This section is now only a title.	11
6	6.1 Reporting an accident	Revised – material change	This section contains the previous content of section 6	11
N/A	6.2 Reporting a dangerous goods incident	Revised – material change	New instructions have been added which are based on those in GERT8000-G1.	11

Table A12: GERT8000-HB7 issue 9 to GERT8000-HB7 issue 10. This table includes only those changes arising from this project, as another project also affects this handbook.

From GERT8000-HB7 issue 9	To GERT8000-HB7 issue 10	Way forward	Comments	Objective
6 Working with a group 6.1 Remaining with your group	6 Working with a group 6.1 Remaining with your group	Revised – material change	New instructions added giving more detail on observing the group. New instruction concerning members not leaving the group to work as a separate group until under the protection of another COSS.	12

Business case for change

Table A13: GERT8000-HB9 issue 8.1 to GERT8000-HB9 issue 9. This table includes only those changes arising from this project, as another project also affects this handbook.

From GERT8000-HB9 issue 8.1	To GERT8000-HB9 issue 9	Way forward	Comments	Objective
3 Working within a work site 3.1 Agreeing the site of work with the ES or SWL	3 Working within a work site 3.1 Agreeing the site of work with the ES	Revised – material change	The requirement to sign the work site certificate RT3199 has been removed.	6

Table A14: GERT8000-HB9 ERTMS issue 2 to GERT8000-HB9ERTMS issue 3. This table includes only those changes arising from this project, as another project also affects this handbook.

From GERT8000-HB9 ERTMS issue 2	To GERT8000-HB9 ERTMS issue 3	Way forward	Comments	Objective
3 Working within a work site 3.1 Agreeing the site of work with the ES or SWL	3 Working within a work site 3.1 Agreeing the site of work with the ES	Revised – material change	The requirement to sign the work site certificate RT3199 has been removed.	6

Table A15: GERT8000-HB11 issue 11 to GERT8000-HB11 issue 12.

From GERT8000-HB11 issue 11	To GERT8000-HB11 issue 12	Way forward	Comments	Objective
4 Taking the possession 4.4 Arranging the possession protection	4 Taking the possession 4.4 Arranging the possession protection	Revised – material change	The PICOP is now permitted to allow an isolation COSS to carry out ac isolation duties.	7
7 Allowing work outside a work site	7 Allowing work outside a work site	Revised – material change	A new instruction added concerning an isolation COSS working outside a work site	7

Business case for change

Table A16: GERT8000-HB12 issue 10 to GERT8000-HB12 issue 11. This table includes only those changes arising from this project, as another project also affects this handbook.

From GERT8000-HB12 issue 10	To GERT8000-HB12 issue 11	Way forward	Comments	Objective
3 Setting up the work site 3.3 Setting up the work site	3 Setting up the work site 3.3 Setting up the work site	Revised – material change	The ES is now permitted to allow an isolation COSS to carry out ac isolation duties	7
4 Agreeing the safe system of work with each COSS/IWA 4.1 Allowing work to take place	4 Agreeing the safe system of work with each COSS/IWA 4.1 Allowing work to take place	Revised – material change	The requirement to sign the work site certificate RT3199 has been removed.	6
4.2 Agreeing the arrangements before the work site is granted	4.2 Agreeing the arrangements before the work site is granted	Revised – material change	The requirement to sign the work site certificate RT3199 has been removed.	6
8 Change of personnel 8.2 Change of COSS	8 Change of personnel 8.2 Change of COSS	Revised – material change	The requirement to sign the work site certificate RT3199 has been removed.	6
10 Giving up the work site 10.1 Normal arrangements	10 Giving up the work site 10.1 Normal arrangements	Revised – material change	The requirement to sign the work site certificate RT3199 has been removed.	6
10.3 When every COSS or IWA no longer needs protection	10.3 When every COSS or IWA no longer needs protection	Revised – material change	The requirement to sign the work site certificate RT3199 has been removed.	6

Business case for change

Table A17: GERT8000-HB12 ERTMS issue 3 to GERT8000-HB12 ERTMS issue 4. This table includes only those changes arising from this project, as another project also affects this handbook.

From GERT8000-HB12 ERTMS issue 3	To GERT8000-HB12 ERTMS issue 4	Way forward	Comments	Objective
2 Competence and identification	2 Competence and identification	Revised – material change	Reference to the obsolete competency of safe work leader (SWL) has been removed.	6
4 Agreeing the safe system of work with each COSS/IWA 4.1 Allowing work to take place	4 Agreeing the safe system of work with each COSS/IWA 4.1 Allowing work to take place	Revised – material change	The requirement to sign the work site certificate RT3199 ERTMS has been removed.	6
4.2 Agreeing the arrangements before the work site is granted	4.2 Agreeing the arrangements before the work site is granted	Revised – material change	The requirement to sign the work site certificate RT3199 ERTMS has been removed.	6
8 Change of personnel 8.1 Change of ES or SWL	8 Change of personnel 8.1 Change of ES	Revised – material change	Reference to the obsolete competency of safe work leader (SWL) has been removed.	6
8.2 Change of COSS	8.2 Change of COSS	Revised – material change	The requirement to sign the work site certificate RT3199 has been removed.	6
10 Giving up the work site 10.1 Normal arrangements	10 Giving up the work site 10.1 Normal arrangements	Revised – material change	The requirement to sign the work site certificate RT3199 has been removed.	6
10.2 Arrangements where the COSS or IWA is to telephone the ES or SWL	10.2 Arrangements where the COSS or IWA is to telephone the ES or SWL	Revised – material change	The title and wording have been changed to remove reference to the obsolete competency of safe work leader (SWL)	6
10.3 When every COSS or IWA no longer needs protection	10.3 When every COSS or IWA no longer needs protection	Revised – material change	The requirement to sign the work site certificate RT3199 has been removed.	6

Business case for change

Table A18: GERT8000-HB19 issue 5 to GERT8000-HB19 issue 6.

From GERT8000-HB19 issue 5	To GERT8000-HB19 issue 6	Way forward	Comments	Objective
5 Equipment that has failed 5.1 Before starting work on the failure	5 Equipment that has failed 5.1 Before starting work on the failure	Revised – material change	The wording has been changed to balance that in GERT8000-TS11 to make it clear that the signalling technician is only operating the points as an interim measure.	15